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Abstract. We propose a process calculus to model high level wireless systems, where the
topology of a network is described by a digraph. The calculus enjoys features which are
proper of wireless networks, namely broadcast communication and probabilistic behaviour.
We first focus on the problem of composing wireless networks, then we present a com-
positional theory based on a probabilistic generalisation of the well known may-testing and
must-testing preorders. Also, we define an extensional semantics for our calculus, which
will be used to define both simulation and deadlock simulation preorders for wireless net-
works. We prove that our simulation preorder is sound with respect to the may-testing
preorder; similarly, the deadlock simulation preorder is sound with respect to the must-
testing preorder, for a large class of networks.
We also provide a counterexample showing that completeness of the simulation preorder,
with respect to the may testing one, does not hold. We conclude the paper with an
application of our theory to probabilistic routing protocols.
1. Introduction
Wireless networks have spread worldwide in the last decades; nowadays they are used
in many areas, from domestic appliances to mobile phone networks, to the newer sensor
infrastructures. One of the main problems of wireless networks is that of defining and
implementing protocols for providing to users the services for which the network has been
designed; also, because of their distributed nature, a more challenging problem is that of
ensuring in a rigorous, mathematical way, the correct behaviour of a network with respect
to some specification.
This problem becomes even more difficult to tackle if we consider that often wire-
less networks run protocols whose behaviour is probabilistic. Such protocols are indeed
very useful for improving the performance of wireless networks, examples being the use of
probabilistic routing protocols [6] or probabilistic protocols for collision avoidance at the
MAC-sublayer of the TCP/IP reference model [20]. Further, problems for which there is
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no solution in a deterministic setting can be solved (in unbounded time) by introducing
probabilistic behaviour in wireless networks [1].
Many different formal frameworks have been developed in the literature for defining and
analysing the behaviour of wireless networks [25, 16, 13, 21, 32, 23, 11, 33, 36]; these differ in
many details, the most important being the level of abstraction used to represent a wireless
network, the computational power of stations of wireless networks and the mathematical
structure used to represent the topology of wireless networks. However, each of these calculi
have the following features in common: wireless networks are represented as a collection of
stations (also called nodes, or locations) running code, and local broadcast is used as the
only way of communication. Roughly speaking in local broadcast communication, whenever
a node broadcasts a message only the nodes in its range of transmission are affected.
In this paper we propose another process calculus for modelling probabilistic wireless
networks; the main concepts underlying our calculus can be summarised as follows:
(i) The topology of a wireless network is static, that is mobility is not considered in
our model. This restriction has been done to allow a more clear presentation of the
topics treated in this paper; however, we could have used the approach described in
[10] to introduce node mobility. The network topology is described by a digraph Γ;
intuitively vertices in this graph represent network locations, while an edge from a
node to another is used for expressing that the latter is in the range of transmission
of the former.
(ii) A probabilistic process calculus is defined for assigning code to locations. The basic
constructs allowed in our calculus are messages’ broadcast and reception, internal
actions, matching and process definitions; further, we allow a special clause ω whose
role will be presented shortly. The mapping that assigns code to locations is partial,
meaning that locations can have no code assigned. At least informally, such nodes,
which will be called external, can be seen as terminals at which users can place code
to test the behaviour of the network.
(iii) Communication between nodes is reliable; a message broadcast by a node along a
channel c will be received by all the nodes in the sender’s range of transmission,
provided that they are waiting to receive a message along such a channel. In other
words, our calculus is designed for describing wireless networks at the network layer of
the TCP/IP reference model ; reliable communication is not ensured at lower levels,
where issues such as the possibility of collisions [20] and synchronisation between
nodes [29] arise.
One of the main goals of the paper is that of defining a compositional behavioural theory
of wireless networks; given two wireless networks M and N , we want to establish whether
they can be distinguished by an external user. To accomplish this task, we need to address
several different topics. First, it is necessary to define how two wireless networks can be
composed together. This topic has already been addressed, for different process calculi, in
[23, 11, 5, 2, 33]. Here we define an asymmetric operator ‖> which can be used to extend one
network with another. Despite being asymmetric, we show that the choice of the operator
‖> is driven by some natural requirements we require in general from a composition operator
between networks. We remark that our theory of composition is restricted to a particular
class of networks, which we call well-formed.
Once we have chosen a suitable composition operator ‖>, we can define a compositional
theory for wireless networks. In this paper we have chosen to focus on a probabilistic
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generalisation of the well-known De Nicola and Hennessy’s testing preorders, whose theory
has been defined in [7] for a probabilistic version of CSP.
Informally speaking, we can test a wireless network M via another wireless network
T which can be composed with the former (with respect to the operator ‖>); that is, the
network (M ‖> T ) is defined. Intuitively, the network M ‖> T can be considered as an
experiment in which the role of the testing component T is that of determining whether
M satisfies some property for which the test has been designed for. The success of an
experiment is denoted by the special construct of our calculus ω mentioned above.
Having this in mind, each computation of the network (M ‖> T ) induces a success
outcome, denoting the probability of reaching a configuration in which the special clause ω
is enabled in such a computation. This induces a set of success outcomes for the network
(M ‖> T ) by quantifying over all the possible computations for such a network.
Knowing how to associate a set of success outcomes to a network, we can compare
two networks M,N by quantifying over all possible tests T , and comparing the sets of
success outcomes of the experiments (M ‖> T ) and (N ‖> T ), provided that they are
both defined. This leads to the definition of two testing preorders, the may-testing preorder
⊑may and must-testing preorder ⊑must, according to the way in which the sets of success
outcomes for the two experiments above are compared.
It is important to note that determining directly whether the statement M ⊑may N
(M ⊑must N ) is true is not easy, due to the quantification over all tests. Therefore there
is the need to define a proof methodology for establishing if two networks can be related
via the ⊑may (⊑must) preorder. This is the main topic of our paper. To this end, we define
an extensional semantics for our calculus of wireless networks; the actions in this semantics
correspond to activities that can be observed by the external nodes. The main idea here
is that of defining sound coinductive proof methods for the testing preorders, based on the
extensional behaviour of networks.
Since our calculus is equipped with local broadcast communication, we need to take care
of some issues in the development of such proof methods; roughly speaking, the broadcast
of a message to a set of external nodes can be simulated by a multicast of the same message
which can be detected by the same set of external nodes. This leads to a non-standard
definition of weak extensional actions, which will be used to define two coinductive relations
between networks. The first one is the well-known simulation preorder [7]; the second one
is a novel preorder, called the deadlock simulation preorder, which is obtained from the
previous one by adding sensitivity to deadlock configurations. The main results of the
papers are that, for a large class of networks, the simulation preorder is sound with respect
to the may-testing preorder, while the inverse of the deadlock simulation preorder is sound
with respect to the must-testing preorder. However, we provide a counterexample that
shows that such proof methods fail to be complete.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we recall the mathematical
tools needed for the development of our theory.
In Section 3 we define the syntax and intensional semantics of our calculus of wireless
networks, and we prove some basic properties of our calculus.
In Section 4 we give the formal definition of the behavioural preorders between networks.
This depends on how tests are applied to networks or more generally how networks are
composed to form larger networks. So we first define our composition operator ‖>, which is
asymmetric, in Section 4.1 and then use it to develop the behavioural preorders ⊑may and
⊑must between networks. In Section 4.4 we return to our choice of composition operator
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‖>, justifying it as the largest one which satisfies three natural requirements. In addition,
somewhat surprisingly, we show that any symmetric composition operator satisfying the
natural requirements generates a degenerate behavioural theory.
In Section 5 we define the extensional semantics of our calculus of wireless networks;
here we also give the non-standard definition of weak extensional actions and we prove
composition and decomposition results for them, with respect to the composition operator
‖>.
In Section 6 we define the notions of simulation and deadlock simulation preorders and
we prove the main results of the paper, namely that the simulation preorder is sound with
respect to the may-testing preorder, and the inverse of the deadlock simulation preorder
is sound with respect to the must-testing preorder. Much of the technical development
underlying these soundness results is relegated to the separate Section 7; this may be safely
skipped by the uninterested reader.
In Section 8 we show that our proof methods fail to be complete; we also show the
impossibility of defining a coinductive relation based on our notion of extensional actions,
which characterises the may-testing relation.
In Section 9 we consider an application of our theory by analysing a simple probabilistic,
connectionless routing protocol, showing that it is behaviourally equivalent to a formal
specification.
We conclude our paper by summarising the topics we have covered and by illustrating
the related work in Section 10. The topics covered in this paper were also the subject of an
extended abstract [4].
2. Background
In this Section we summarise the mathematical concepts, taken from [7], that will be needed
throughout the paper. First we introduce some basic concepts from probability theory; then
we show how these can be used to model concurrent systems which exhibit both probabilistic
and non-deterministic behaviour.
Let S be a set; a function ∆ : S → [0, 1] is called a (probability) sub-distribution over
S if
∑
s∈S ∆(s) ≤ 1. This quantity,
∑
s∈S∆(s), is called the mass of the sub-distribution,
denoted as |∆|. If |∆| = 1, then we say that ∆ is a (full) distribution. The support of a
sub-distribution ∆, denoted ⌈∆⌉, is the subset of S consisting of all those elements which
contribute to its mass, namely ⌈∆⌉ = {s ∈ S | ∆(s) > 0}.
For any set S, the empty sub-distribution ε ∈ Dsub(S) is the only sub-distribution with
empty support, that is ⌈ε⌉ = ∅. For each s ∈ S, the point distribution s is defined to be
the distribution which takes value 1 at s, and 0 elsewhere. The set of sub-distributions and
distributions over a set S are denoted by Dsub(S) and D(S), respectively.
Given a family of sub-distributions {∆k}k∈K ,
(∑
k∈K ∆k
)
is the partial real-valued
function in S → R defined by
(∑
k∈K ∆k
)
(s) :=
∑
k∈K ∆k(s). This is a partial operation
because for a given s ∈ S this sum might not exist; it is also a partial operation on sub-
distributions because even if the sum does exist it may be greater than 1.
Similarly, if p ≤ 1 and ∆ is a sub-distribution , then p ·∆ is the sub-distribution over
S such that (p ·∆)(s) = p ·∆(s).
It is not difficult to show that if {pk}k∈K is a sequence of positive real numbers such
that
∑
k∈K pk ≤ 1, and {∆k}k∈K is a family of sub-distributions over a set S, then
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(∑
k∈K pk ·∆k
)
always defines a sub-distribution over S. Further, if
∑
k∈K pk = 1 and
each ∆k is a distribution, then
(∑
k∈K pk ·∆k
)
is a distribution.
Finally, if f : X → Y and ∆ is a sub-distribution over X then we use f(∆) to be the
sub-distribution over Y defined by:
f(∆)(y) =
∑
x∈X
{∆(x) | f(x) = y }. (2.1)
This definition can be generalised to two arguments functions; if f : X1 × X2 → Y is a
function, and ∆,Θ are two sub-distributions respectively over X1 and X2, then f(∆,Θ)
denotes the sub-distribution over Y defined as
f(∆,Θ)(y) =
∑
x1∈X1,x2∈X2
{∆(x1) ·Θ(x2) | f(x1, x2) = y }. (2.2)
Now we turn our attention to probabilistic concurrent systems. The formal model we use to
represent them is a generalisation to a probabilistic setting of Labelled Transition Systems
(LTSs) [24].
Definition 2.1. A probabilistic labelled transition system (pLTS) is a 4-tuple
〈S,Actτ ,→, ω〉, where
(i) S is a set of states,
(ii) Actτ is a set of transition labels with a distinguished label τ ,
(iii) the relation → is a subset of S × Actτ ×D(S),
(iv) ω : S 7→ { true , false } is a (success) predicate over the states S.
As usual, we will write s
µ
−→∆ in lieu of (s, α,∆) ∈ −→.
Before discussing pLTSs, some definitions first: a pLTS whose state space is finite is
said to be finite state; further, we say that a pLTS 〈S,Actτ ,→, ω〉 is finite branching if, for
every s ∈ S, the set {∆ | s
µ
−→∆ for some µ ∈ Actτ } is finite. Finally, a finitary pLTS is
one which is both finite state and finite branching.
We have included in the definition of a pLTS a success predicate ω over states, which
will be used when testing processes. Apart from this, the only difference between LTSs and
pLTSs is given by the definition of the transition relation; in the latter this is defined to
be a relation (parametric in some action µ) between states and distributions of states, thus
capturing the concept of probabilistic behaviour.
However, this modification introduces some difficulties when sequences of transitions
performed by a given pLTS have to be considered, as the domain and the image of the
transition relation do not coincide. To avoid this problem, we will focus only on distributions
of states by defining transitions for them. The following Definition serves to this purpose:
Definition 2.2 (Lifted Relations). Let R ⊆ S × Dsub(S) be a relation from states to
sub-distributions. Then R ⊆ Dsub(S)×Dsub(S) is the smallest relation which satisfies
• sR∆ implies s R ∆
• If I is a finite index set and ∆i R Θi for each i ∈ I then (
∑
i∈I pi ·∆i) R (
∑
i∈I pi · Θi)
whenever
(∑
i∈I pi
)
≤ 1.
Lifting can also be defined for relations from states to probability distributions, by simply
requiring
∑
i∈I pi = 1 in the last constraint of the definition above.
Sometimes it will be convenient to consider also the lifting of relations of the form
R ⊆ S × S; this is defined by first lifting the relation R to Re ⊆ S × Dsub(S), by letting
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s Re Θ iff Θ = t for some t ∈ S such that s R t. Then we obtain the relation Re by
applying Definition 2.2 to Re.
In a pLTS 〈S,Actτ ,→, ω〉, each transition relation
µ
−→ ⊆ S × D(S) can be lifted to
(
µ
−→) ⊆ D(S)×D(S). With an abuse of notation, the latter will still be denoted as
µ
−→.
Lifted transition relations allow us to reason about the behaviour of pLTSs in terms
of sequences of transitions; here we are mainly interested in the behaviour of a pLTS in
the long run; that is, given a pLTS 〈S,Actτ ,→, ω〉 and a sub-distribution ∆ ⊆ Dsub(S), we
are interested in the sub-distributions Θ ⊆ Dsub(S) which can be reached from ∆ after an
unbounded number of transitions.
For the moment we will focus only on internal actions of a pLTS, in which case the
behaviour of a pLTS in the long run is captured by the concept of hyper-derivation:
Definition 2.3 (Hyper-derivations). In a pLTS a hyper-derivation consists of a collection
of sub-distributions ∆,∆→k ,∆
×
k , for k ≥ 0, with the following properties:
∆ = ∆→0 + ∆
×
0
∆→0
τ
−→ ∆→1 + ∆
×
1
...
∆→k
τ
−→ ∆→k+1 + ∆
×
k+1
...
If ω(s) = false for each s ∈ ⌈∆→k ⌉ and k ≥ 0 we call ∆
′ =
∑∞
k=0∆
×
k a hyper-derivative of
∆, and write ∆ =⇒∆′.
We will often write s=⇒∆ in lieu of s=⇒∆.
Example 2.4. Let us illustrate how hyper-derivations can be inferred in a pLTS via a simple
example. A central role in hyper-derivations will be played by the empty sub-distribution
ε. Note that, in any pLTS 〈S,Actτ ,→, ω〉, for any action α ∈ Actτ we have that ε
α
−→ ε.
Let us consider a pLTS whose state space is given by the set {h, t}, with the only
transition s
τ
−→ 1/2 · h + 1/2 · t and with ω(t) = true. This pLTS models a probabilistic
experiment in which we continuously toss a fair coin until we obtain the outcome tail
(represented by the state t), in which case we decree that the experiment succeeded; this
last constraint is represented by letting ω(t) = true. It is well-known, from elementary
probability arguments, that the probability of obtaining a success before the coin has been
tossed k times is 2
k−1
2k
, while in the long run the experiment will succeed with probability
1. This behaviour can be inferred by using hyper-derivations. For example, for any k ≥ 0
we can consider the infinite sequence of transitions
∆→0 = h
τ
−→
1
2
· h +
1
2
· t
∆→1 =
1
2
· h
τ
−→
1
22
· h +
1
22
· t
...
τ
−→
...
...
∆→k−2 =
1
2k−2
· h
τ
−→
1
2k−1
· h +
1
2k−1
· t
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∆→k−1 =
1
2k−1
· h
τ
−→ ε +
1
2k
· h+
1
2k
· t
∆→k = ε
τ
−→ ε + ε
...
τ
−→
...
...
∆→k+n = ε
τ
−→ ε + ε
...
τ
−→
...
...
Note that the sequence of transitions above models a situation in which the experiment
is stopped after the coin has been tossed k times. This is done by letting ∆→k = ε; at
least informally this means that the computation proceeds with probability 0 after the k-th
τ -transition has been performed. The sequence of transitions above leads to the hyper-
derivation
h =⇒
(
k−1∑
i=1
1
2i
· t
)
+
(
1
2k
h+
1
2k
t
)
+
(
∞∑
i=k+1
ε
)
=
=
1
2k
· h+
(
k∑
i=1
1
2i
· t
)
=
=
1
2k
· h+
2k − 1
2k
· t
That is, after k transitions have been performed the probability of having successfully
terminated the experiment is (2k − 1)/2k.
Further, note that we can use hyper-derivations to describe the limiting behaviour of
the experiment. In fact, we can consider the infinite sequence of transitions
h
τ
−→
1
2
· h +
1
2
· t
1
2
· h
τ
−→
1
22
· h +
1
22
· t
...
τ
−→
...
...
1
2k
· h
τ
−→
1
2k+1
· h +
1
2k+1
· t
...
τ
−→
...
...
which leads to the hyper-derivation
h=⇒
(
∞∑
i=1
1
2i
· t
)
= t
Hyper-derivations can be seen as the probabilistic counterpart of the weak
τ
=⇒ action in
LTSs; see [7] for a detailed discussion. Intuitively speaking, they represent fragments of
computations obtained by performing only internal actions. The last constraint in Definition
2.3 is needed since we introduced a success predicate in our model; as we see pLTSs as
nondeterministic, probabilistic experiments, we require that a computation stops when the
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experiment succeeds, that is when a state s such that ω(s) = true has been reached. States
in which the predicate ω(·) is true are called ω-successful.
Further, we are mainly interested in maximal computations of distributions. That is,
we require a computation to proceed as long as some internal activity can be performed.
To this end, we say that ∆ =⇒≻ ∆′ if
• ∆=⇒∆′,
• for every s ∈ ⌈∆′⌉, s
τ
−→ implies ω(s) = true.
This is a mild generalisation of the notion of extreme derivative from [7]. Note that the last
constraint models exactly the requirement of performing some internal activity whenever
it is possible; In other words extreme derivatives correspond to a probabilistic version of
maximal computations.
Example 2.5. Consider again the pLTS of Example 2.4. Here we have that the hyper-
derivation h =⇒ Θ = 1
2k
· h + 2
k−1
2k
· t, where k ≥ 0, is not an extreme derivation, since
ω(h) = false and h
τ
−→. On the other hand, the hyper-derivation h=⇒ t is also an extreme
derivation, since ω(t) = true; therefore h =⇒≻ t.
Theorem 2.6. In an arbitrary pLTS
(i) =⇒ is reflexive and transitive,
(ii) if ∆ =⇒ ∆′ and ∆′ =⇒≻ ∆′′, then ∆ =⇒≻ ∆′′; this is a direct consequence of the
previous statement, and the definition of extreme derivatives,
(iii) suppose ∆ =
(∑
i∈I pi ·∆i
)
, where I is an index set and
∑
i∈I pi ≤ 1. If for any
i ∈ I,∆i =⇒Θi for some Θi, then ∆=⇒Θ, where Θ =
(∑
i∈I pi ·Θi
)
,
(iv) for all sub-distributions ∆, there exists a sub-distribution Θ such that ∆ =⇒≻ Θ.
Proof. See [7] for detailed proofs.
The last definition we need is that of convergent pLTSs. Intuitively these are pLTSs
whose infinite computations have a negligible probability.
Definition 2.7 (Convergence). A pLTS 〈S,Actτ ,−→, ω〉 is said to be convergent if s=⇒ ε
for no state s ∈ S.
At least informally, s=⇒ε means that there exists a computation rooted in s which contains
only probability sub-distributions which can always perform a τ -action. See [7], Section 6
for a detailed discussion on divergence in pLTSs. The main property we will require from
convergent pLTSs is the following:
Proposition 2.8. Let ∆ be a distribution in a convergent pLTS. If ∆=⇒Θ then |Θ| = 1.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Distillation of Divergence, Theorem 6.20 of
[7].
3. The calculus
In this Section we introduce our calculus for modelling wireless networks. In this calculus, a
wireless network is modelled as a pair of the form (Γ✄M), where Γ is a digraph representing
the topology of a wireless network and M is a term which assigns code to nodes.
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M, N ::= Systems
nJsK Nodes
M |N Composition
0 Identity
p, q ::= (probabilistic) Processes
s
p p⊕ q probabilistic choice
s, t ::= States
c!〈e〉 .p broadcast
c?(x) .p receive
ω.0 test
s+ t choice
if b then s else t branch
τ.p preemption
A(x˜) definitions
0 terminate
Figure 1: Syntax
The syntax of our calculus is presented in Section 3.1; here we also give some basic
examples of wireless networks. In Section 3.2 we formalise how networks evolve by intro-
ducing an intensional semantics for our calculus; finally we prove some basic properties of
our calculus in Section 3.3.
3.1. Syntax. The calculus we present is designed to model broadcast systems, particularly
wireless networks, at a high level. We do not deal with low level issues, such as collisions
of broadcast messages or multiplexing mechanisms [35]; instead, we assume that network
nodes use protocols at the MAC level [20] to achieve a reliable communication between
nodes.
Basically, the language will contain both primitives for sending and receiving messages
and will enjoy the following features:
(i) communication can be obtained through the use of different channels; although the
physical medium for exchanging messages in wireless networks is unique, it is rea-
sonable to assume that network nodes use some multiple access technique, such as
TDMA or FDMA [35], to setup and communicate through virtual channels,
(ii) communication is broadcast; whenever a node in a given network sends a message, it
can be detected by all nodes in its range of transmission,
(iii) communication is reliable; whenever a node broadcasts a message and a neighbouring
node (that is, a node in the sender’s range of transmission) is waiting to receive a
message on the same channel, then the message will be delivered to the receiver. This
is not ensured if low level issues are considered, as problems such as message collisions
[20] and nodes synchronisation [29] arise .
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m
n
i
e
o1
o2
m
n
i
e
k
o1
o2
M = ΓM ✄ nJAnK | iJAiK |mJAmK N = ΓN ✄ nJAnK | iJAiK |mJAkK | kJAmK
Figure 2: Example networks
The language for system terms, ranged over by M, N, · · · is given in Figure 1. Basically
a system consists of a collection of named nodes at each of which there is some running
code. The syntax for this code is a fairly straightforward instance of a standard process
calculus, augmented by a probabilistic choice; code descriptions have the usual constructs
for channel based communication, with input c?(x) .p being the unique binder. This gives
rise to the standard notions of alpha-conversion, free and bound occurrences of variables in
system terms and closed system terms.
We only consider the sub-language of well-formed system terms in which all node names
have at most one occurrence. We use sSys to range over all closed well-formed terms. A
(well-formed) system term can be viewed as a mapping that assigns to node names the
code they are executing. A sub-term nJsK appearing in a system term M represents node
n running code s. In the following we make use of standard conventions; we omit trailing
occurrences of 0 and we use
∏n
i=1miJsiK to denote the system term m1Js1K | · · · |mnJsnK.
Additional information such as the connectivity between nodes of a network is needed to
formalise communications between nodes. Network connectivity is represented by a graph
Γ = 〈ΓV , ΓE 〉; here ΓV is a finite set of nodes and ΓE ⊆ (ΓV ×ΓV ) is an irreflexive relation
between nodes in ΓV . Intuitively, (m,n) ∈ ΓE models the possibility for node n to detect
broadcasts fired by m.
We use the more graphic notation Γ ⊢ v to mean v ∈ ΓV and Γ ⊢ m→ n for (m,n) ∈
ΓE. Similarly we use Γ ⊢ n ← m to denote Γ ⊢ m → n. Sometimes we also use the
notations Γ ⊢ m↔ n for {(n,m), (m,n)} ⊆ ΓE and Γ ⊢ m⇄ n to denote either Γ ⊢ m→ n
or Γ ⊢ m← n.
A network consists of a pair (Γ✄M), representing the system M , from sSys, executing
relative to the connectivity graph Γ. All nodes occurring in M , nodes(M), will appear in
Γ and the effect of running the code at n ∈ nodes(M) will depend on the connectivity of n
in Γ. But in general there will be nodes in Γ which do not occur in M ; let Intf(Γ ✄M) =
ΓV \ nodes(M); we call this set the interface of the network Γ ✄M , and its elements are
called external nodes. Intuitively these are nodes which may be used to compose the network
Γ✄M with other networks, or to place code for testing the behaviour of M .
In the following we use the meta-variables M,N , · · · to range over networks. Also, the
notation introduced for system terms and connectivity graphs is extended to networks in
the obvious way; for example, if M = (Γ ✄M), nodes(M) = nodes(M), MV = ΓV and
M ⊢ m→ n denotes Γ ⊢ m→ n.
MODELLING PROBABILISTIC WIRELESS NETWORKS 11
Example 3.1. Consider M described in Figure 2. There are six nodes, three occupied
by code n, i and m, and three in the interface Intf(M) , e, o1 and o2. Here, and in future
examples, we differentiate between the interface and the occupied (internal) nodes using
shading. Suppose the code at nodes is given by
An ⇐ c?(x) .d!〈x〉 .0 Ai ⇐ d?(x) .d!〈f(x)〉 .0 Am ⇐ d?(x) .(d!〈x〉 .0 0.8⊕ 0)
Then M can receive input from node e at its interface along the channel c; this is passed
on to the internal node i using channel d, where it is transformed in some way, described
by the function f1, and then forwarded to node m, where 80% of the time it is broadcast
to the external nodes o1 and o2. The remainder of the time the message is lost.
The network N has the same interface asM, but has an extra internal node k connected
to o2, and m is only connected to one interface node o1 and the internal node k. The nodes
i and n have the same code running as in M, while nodes m and k will run the code
Ak ⇐ d?(x) .(d!〈x〉 .0 0.9⊕ 0)
Intuitively, the behaviour of N is more complex than that of M; indeed, there is the
possibility for a computation of N to deliver a value only to one between the external nodes
o1 and o2, while this is not possible in N . However, 81% of the times this message will be
delivered to both these nodes, and thus it is more reliable than M. Suppose now that we
change the code at the intermediate node m in M,
M1 = ΓM ✄ . . . |mJBmK where Bm ⇐ d?(x) .(τ.(d!〈x〉 .0 0.5⊕ 0) + τ.d!〈x〉 .0)
InM1 the behaviour at the nodem is non-deterministic; it may act like a perfect forwarder,
or one which is only 50% reliable. Optimistically it could be more reliable than M, or
pessimistically it could be less reliable than the latter. Further, there is no possibility for
the network M1 to forward the message to only one of the external nodes o1, o2, so that
its behaviour is somewhat less complex than that of N .
As a further variation let M2 be the result of replacing the code at m with
Cm ⇐ d?(x) .D
D ⇐ τ.(d!〈x〉 .0 0.5⊕ τ.D)
Here the behaviour is once more deterministic, with the probability that the message will
be eventually transmitted successfully through node k approaching 1 in the limit. Thus,
this network is as reliable as M1, when the latter is viewed optimistically.
3.2. Intensional Semantics. We now turn our attention on the operational semantics of
networks. Following [7], processes will be interpreted as probability distributions of states;
such an interpretation is encoded by the function P(·) defined below:
P(s) = s
P(p1 p⊕ p2) = p · P(p1)+(1− p) · P(p2) .
1For example, if we assume the set of closed values to be Z, f could be the mapping f : z 7→ z2.
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(s-Snd)
c!〈e〉 .p
c!JeK
−→ P(p)
(s-Rcv)
c?(x) .p
c?v
−→ P(p{v/x})
(s-τ)
τ.p
τ
−→ P(p)
(s-Suml)
s
α
−→∆
s+ t
α
−→∆
(s-SumR)
t
α
−→∆
s+ t
α
−→∆
(s-then)
s
α
−→∆
if b then s else t
α
−→∆
JbK = true
(s-else)
t
α
−→∆
if b then s else t
α
−→∆
JbK = false
(s-Call)
s{e˜/x˜}
µ
−→∆
A(e˜)
µ
−→∆
A(x˜)⇐ s
Figure 3: Pre-semantics of states
Sometimes we will need to consider the probability distribution associated to system terms;
this is done by letting
P(0) = 0
P(nJpK) = nJP(p)K
P(M1 |M2) = P(M1) |P(M2)
where nJP(p)K represents a distribution over sSys, obtained by a direct application of Equa-
tion (2.1) to the function nJ·K which maps states into system terms. Similarly, P(M1 |M2)
is obtained by applying Equation (2.2) to the function (· | ·) : sSys× sSys→ sSys.
The intensional semantics of networks is defined incrementally. We first define a pre-
semantics for states, which is then used for giving the judgements of (state based) networks.
The pre-semantics for states takes the form
s
α
−→∆
where s is a closed state, that is containing no free occurrences of a variable, ∆ is a distribu-
tion of states and µ can take one of the forms c!v, c?v or τ . The deductive rules for inferring
these judgements are given in Figure 3 and should be self-explanatory. It assumes some
mechanism for evaluating closed data-expressions e to values JeK. Note that we assume that
definitions have the form A(x˜)⇐ s, where s is a state; this is because actions for definitions
are inherited by the state that is associated to them, and judgements are not defined for
(probabilistic) processes. Also, note that we have a special state ω for which no rule has
been defined. The role of this construct will become clear in Section 4.
Judgements in the intensional semantics of networks take the form
Γ✄M
µ
−→∆
where Γ is a network connectivity, M is a system from sSys, and ∆ is a distribution over
sSys; intuitively this means that relative to the connectivity Γ the systemM can perform the
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(b-broad)
s
c!v
−→∆
Γ✄ nJsK
n.c!v
−→ nJ∆K
(b-rec)
s
c?v
−→∆
Γ✄ nJsK
m.c?v
−→ nJ∆K
Γ ⊢ m→ n
(b-deaf)
s 6
c?v
−−→
Γ✄ nJsK
m.c?v
−→ nJsK
(b-disc)
Γ✄ nJsK
m.c?v
−→ nJsK
Γ ⊢ m 6→ n
(b- 0)
0m.c?v−→ 0
(b-τ)
s
τ
−→ p
Γ✄ nJsK
n.τ
−→ nJ∆K
P(p) = ∆
(b-τ.prop)
Γ✄M
n.τ
−→∆
Γ✄M |N
n.τ
−→∆ |N
(b-prop)
Γ✄M
m.c?v
−→ ∆, Γ✄N
m.c?v
−→ Θ
Γ✄M |N
m.c?v
−→ ∆ |Θ
(b-sync)
Γ✄M
m.c!v
−→ ∆, Γ✄N
m.c?v
−→ Θ
Γ✄M |N
m.c!v
−→ ∆ |Θ
Figure 4: Intensional semantics of networks
action µ, and with probability ∆(N) be transformed into the system N , for every N ∈ ⌈∆⌉.
The action labels can take the form
(i) receive, n.c?v, meaning that the value v is detected on channel c by all nodes in
nodes(M) which are reachable from n in Γ,
(ii) broadcast, n.c!v: meaning the node n (occurring in nodes(M), and therefore in Γ)
broadcasts the value v on channel c to all nodes directly connected to n in Γ
(iii) internal activity, n.τ , meaning some internal activity performed by node n.
The rules for inferring judgements are given in Figure 4. Here we have omitted the sym-
metric counterparts of rules (b-Sync) and (b-TauProp). Rule (b-broad) models the
capability for a node to broadcast a value v through channel c, assuming the code running
there is capable of broadcasting along c. Here the distribution ∆ is in turn obtained from
the residual of the state s after the broadcast action.
Example 3.2. Consider the simple network Γ✄ nJsK where Γ is an arbitrary connectivity
graph and the code s has the form c!〈v〉 .(s1 1/4⊕ s2).
The pre-semantics of states determines that s
c!v
−→P(s1 1/4⊕ s2) = 1/4 · s1+ 3/4 · s2, using
Rule (b-Snd) Thus according to the rule (b-broad) we have the judgement
Γ✄ nJsK
n.c!v
−→
1
4
· nJs1K +
3
4
· nJs2K
Rules (b-rec), (b-deaf) and (b-disc) express how a node reacts when a message is broad-
cast; the first essentially models the capability of a node which is listening to a channel c,
and which appears in the sender’s range of transmission, to receive the message correctly.
The other two rules model situations in which a node is not listening to the channel used to
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broadcast a message, or it is not in the range of transmission of the sender; In both cases
this node cannot detect the transmission at all.
The rules (b-τ) and (b-τ.prop) model internal activities performed by some node of
a system term; the latter (together with its symmetric counterpart) expresses the inability
for a node which performs an internal activity to affect other nodes in a system term. Here
again, ∆ |Θ is a distribution over sSys, this time obtained by instantiating Equation (2.2)
to the function (· | ·) : sSys× sSys→ sSys.
Finally, rules (b-sync) and (b-prop) describe how communication between nodes of a
network is handled; here the result of a synchronisation between an output and an input is
again an output, thus modelling broadcast communication [28].
3.3. Properties of the Calculus. We conclude this section by summarising the main
properties enjoyed by the intensional semantics of our calculus.
Here (and in the rest of the paper) it will be convenient to identify networks and
distributions of networks up to a structural congruence relation ≡. This is first defined
for states as the smallest equivalence relation which is a commutative monoid with respect
to + and 0, and which satisfies the equations if b then s else t ≡ s if JbK = true,
if b then s else t ≡ t if JbK = false and A(e˜) ≡ s{e˜/x˜} if A(x˜) ⇐ s. For system terms, we
let ≡ be the smallest equivalence relation which is a commutative monoid with respect to
(· | ·) and 0, and which satisfies the equation s ≡ t implies mJsK ≡ mJtK for any node m.
Finally, we let (ΓM ✄M) ≡ (ΓN✄N) iff Γ1 = Γ2 andM ≡ N . Structural congruence is also
defined for distributions of networks via the lifted relation ≡e. With an abuse of notation,
the latter is still denoted as ≡.
The properties that we prove in this section give an explicit form to the structure of a
network (Γ ✄M) and a distribution ∆ in the case that an action (Γ ✄M)
µ
−→ ∆ can be
inferred in the intensional semantics presented in Section 3.2.
Proposition 3.3 (Tau-actions). Let Γ✄M be a network; then Γ✄M
m.τ
−→∆ if and only if
(i) M ≡ mJ(τ.p) + sK |N ,
(ii) ∆ ≡ P(mJpK) |N
Outline of the Proof. We first need to prove a similar statement for states. Let t be a state;
then t
τ
−→Θ if and only if t ≡ τ.p+s for some p, s such that P(p) = Θ. The two implications
of this statement are proved separately.
To prove Proposition 3.3 suppose first that Γ✄M
m.τ
−→∆ for some distribution ∆. We
show that M ≡ mJτ.p+ sK |N , ∆ ≡ P(mJpK) |N by structural induction on the proof of the
derivation above.
If the last rule applied is (b-τ), thenM = mJtK for some t such that t
τ
−→Θ , ∆ = mJΘK.
Since t
τ
−→Θ then t ≡ τ.p+ s for some process p such that P(p) = Θ, which also gives
∆ = P(mJpK). By definition of structural congruence M ≡ mJτ.p + sK ≡ mJτ.p + sK | 0.
Further, ∆ ≡ P(mJpK) |0, and there is nothing left to prove.
If the last rule applied is (b-τ.prop), thenM ≡ N |L for some N,L such that N
m.τ
−→∆N ;
further, ∆ = ∆N | L. By inductive hypothesis we have that N ≡ mJτ.p + sK | N
′ and
∆N ≡ P(mJpK) |N ′. By performing some simple calculations we find that M ≡ N | L ≡
mJτ.p+ sK | (N ′ | L) and ∆ ≡ ∆N | L ≡ P(mJpK) |(N ′ | L) ≡ P(mJpK) |(N ′ | L).
Conversely, suppose that M ≡ mJτ.p + sK | N ; in this case it suffices to perform a
rule induction on the proof of the equivalence above to show that Γ ✄M
m.τ
−→ ∆, where
∆ ≡ P(mJpK) |N .
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Proposition 3.4 (Input). For any network Γ✄M we have that Γ✄M
m.c?v
−→ ∆ iff
(i) m /∈ nodes(M),
(ii) M ≡
∏
i∈I niJ(c?(x) .pi) + siK |
∏
j∈J njJsjK,
(iii) for any i ∈ I, Γ ⊢ m→ ni,
(iv) for any j ∈ J , either Γ ⊢ m 6→ nj or sj
c?v
−→6 ,
(v) ∆ ≡ P(
∏
i∈I niJpi{v/x}K) |
∏
j∈J njJsjK.
Proposition 3.5 (Broadcast). Let Γ✄M be a network; then Γ✄M
m.c!v
−→ ∆ for some ∆ iff
(i) M ≡ mJ(c!〈e〉 .p+ s)K |N , where JeK = v,
(ii) Γ✄N
m.c?v
−→ Θ,
(iii) ∆ ≡ P(mJpK) |Θ.
An immediate consequence of the results above is that actions in the intensional semantics
are preserved by structurally congruent networks.
Corollary 3.6. Let M,N be two networks such that M≡ N . If M
µ
−→∆ then N
µ
−→Θ
for some Θ such that ∆ ≡ Θ.
Another trivial consequence that follows from the results above is that the intensional
semantics does not change the structure of a network.
Definition 3.7 (Stable distributions). A (node)-stable sub-distribution ∆ ∈ Dsub(sSys) is
one for which whenever M,N ∈ ⌈∆⌉ it follows that nodes(M) = nodes(N). A distribution
over networks is said to be (node)-stable if it has the form Γ ✄∆, and ∆ is a stable sub-
distribution in Dsub(sSys).
Corollary 3.8. Whenever Γ✄M
µ
−→∆ then ∆ is node-stable; further, for any N ∈ ⌈∆⌉
we have that nodes(M) = nodes(N).
4. Compositional Reasoning for Networks
The aim of this Section is to develop preorders of the form
M ❁∼behav N (4.1)
Intuitively this means that the networkM can be replaced by N , as a part of a larger overall
network, without any loss of behaviour. The intention is that the internal structure of the
networks M, N should play no role in this comparison; the names used to identify their
internal stations and the their communication topology should not be important. Intuitively
the only behaviour to be taken into account in this extensional comparison is the reception
of values at the their interface, the values subsequently broadcast at the interface.
To formalise this concept we need to say how networks are composed to form larger
networks. In Section 4.1 we propose a specific composition operator, ‖> for this purpose, and
briefly discuss its properties. We then use this operator in Section 4.2 to say how network
behaviour is determined. In Section 4.3, we give the formal definition of the behavioural
preorders, in a relatively standard manner following [27]; this section also treats some
examples. The nature of these preorders depends on our particular choice of composition
operator ‖>. In Section 4.4 we return to this point and offer a justification for our choice;
this section may be safely ignored by the reader who is uninterested in this subtlety.
However first let us reconsider the informal requirements of the proposed behavioural
preorder (4.1) above. We have already mentioned that it should not depend on the internal
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m
o1
o2
m
o1
o2
M = ΓM ✄mJc!〈v〉K N = ΓN ✄mJc!〈v〉K
Figure 5: A well-formed and an ill-formed network
structure of N ,M. But equally well N ,M should not be able to make any assumptions
about the topology of their external environment.
Example 4.1. Consider the networks M and N depicted in Figure 5. At least intu-
itively the extensional behaviour of these two networks is the same: a broadcast of value
v along channel c can be detected by the external nodes o1 and o2. However N makes
an assumption about the external environment, namely that there is a connection between
the external nodes o1 and o2. This slight difference can be exploited to distinguish be-
tween them behaviourally. Suppose that we place the code c?(x) .c!〈w〉 at node o1 and
the code c?(x) .c?(y) .ω at node o2 to test the behaviour of both networks. In practice, let
T = o1Jc?(x) .c!〈w〉K | o2Jc?(x) .c?(y) .ωK, and consider the networksM
′ = ΓM ✄mJc!〈v〉K |T
and N ′ = ΓN ✄mJc!〈v〉K |T . In the first network the node o2 can detect both the broadcast
fired by node m and node o1, leading to a state in which the special action ω is enabled.
However, the same is not possible in N ′, since there is no connection between the external
nodes o1 and o2. That is, node o2 can only detect the broadcast fired by node m, ending
in a state in which the special action ω remains guarded by an input. As we will see later,
the clause ω plays a crucial role in distinguishing networks.
The problem in Example 4.1 is caused by the presence of a connection between the two
external nodes in the network N of Figure 5; intuitively this represents an assumption of
N about its external environment. To avoid this problem, we focus on a specific class of
networks in which connections between external nodes are not allowed. Also, we require
external nodes to have at least a connection with some internal node.
Definition 4.2 (Well-Formed Networks). A network M is well-formed iff
(i) whenever M ⊢ m⇄ n then either m ∈ nodes(M) or n ∈ nodes(M),
(ii) whenever M ⊢ m and M ⊢ m⇄ n for no n ∈ (M)V , then m ∈ nodes(M).
Henceforth we will only focus on well-formed networks, unless stated otherwise. We denote
the set of well-formed networks as Nets.
Finally let us provide some definitions which will be useful in the sequel. Let M be a
(well-formed) network. We say that a node i ∈ Intf(M) is an input node if M ⊢ m ← i
for some m2; conversely, if a node o ∈ Intf(M) is such that Γ ⊢ m → o we say that
o is an output node. If we let In(M) = {i | i is an input node in M} and Out(M) =
{o | o is an output node in M} it is easy to check that Intf(M) = In(M) ∪ Out(M).
2Note that by well-formedness this implies m ∈ nodes(M).
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4.1. Composing Networks. One use of composition operators is to enable compositional
reasoning. For example the task of establishing
N1 ❁∼behav N2 (4.2)
can be simplified if we can discover a common component, that is some N such that N1 =
M1 9N and N2 =M2 9N for some composition operator 9; then (4.2) can be reduced to
establishing
M1 ❁∼behav M2,
assuming that the behavioural preorder in question, ❁∼behav, is preserved by the composition
operator 9.
However another use of a composition operator is in the definition of the behavioural
preorder ❁∼behav itself. Intuitively we can define
N1 ❁∼behav N2 (4.3)
to be true if for every component T which can be composed with both N1 and N2, the
external observable behaviour of the composite networks N1 9 T and N2 9 T are related in
some appropriate way. T is a testing network which is probing N1 and N2 for behavioural
differences, along the lines used informally in Example 4.1. Intuitively this should be black-
box testing, in which the tester, namely T , should have no access to the internal stations
of the networks being tested, namely N1 and N2. All it can do is place code at their
external interfaces, to transmit values and examine the subsequent effects, as seen again at
the interfaces.
Definition 4.3 (Composing networks). For any two networksM = ΓM✄M and P = ΓP✄P
let M ‖> P be given by:
(ΓM ✄M) ‖> (ΓP ✄ P ) =
{
(ΓM ∪ ΓP )✄ (M | P ), if nodes(M) ∩ (P)V = ∅
undefined, otherwise
The composed connectivity graph ΓM∪ΓP is defined by letting (ΓM∪ΓP )V = (ΓM )V ∪(ΓP )V
and (ΓM ∪ ΓN )E = (ΓM )E ∪ (ΓP )E .
The intuition here is that the composed network M ‖> P is constructed by extending the
network under test, M, allowing code to be placed at its interface, and allowing completely
fresh stations to be added. These fresh stations can be used by the tester to compute the
results of probes made on M.
Proposition 4.4. Suppose M,N ,P ∈ Nets. Then
(1) M ‖> P ∈ Nets, whenever it is defined
(2) (M ‖> N ) ‖> P =M ‖> (N ‖> P), whenever both are defined
Proof. The two statements are proved separately. The proofs are given in a separate ap-
pendix, Appendix A; see pages 59 and 60.
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m
o1
o2
o1
e
o2
m
o1
o2
e
M N (M ‖> N )
Figure 6: Network composition via ‖>
There is an inherent asymmetry in the definition of our composition operator; inM ‖> P
we allow P to place code at the interface nodes of M but not the converse. As a result the
operator is not in general symmetric, as can be seen from Example 4.5.
Example 4.5 (‖> is asymmetric). Let M,N be the networks depicted in Figure 6. Here
the network M ‖> N is well-defined and depicted on the right of Figure 6. Intuitively, this
is the network obtained by extendingM with the information provided by N ; these include
the code running at nodes o1, o2, a connection between such nodes, and a connection from
o1, o2, respectively, to a fresh node e, whose running code is left unspecified. The network
M ‖> N is well-defined because none of the connections specified in N involve the node
m ∈ nodes(M); that is, when extendingM with N it is ensured that the latter can interact
with the node m only via the nodes o1, o2.
On the other hand, the composition N ‖> M is not defined. Intuitively, in N nodes
o1 and o2 can interact with the external environment only via the external node e. This is
in contrast with the definition of M, where node m can be used to broadcast messages to
such nodes.
One might wonder if a symmetric composition operator could be used in place of our
‖>; this point is discussed at length in Section 4.4. Nevertheless ‖> is a natural operator, and
the next result shows that it can be used to construct all non-degenerate networks starting
from single nodes. Let G be the collection of networks which contain exactly one occupied
node, that is G = {(Γ✄G) | G ≡ mJsK for some s,m}.
Proposition 4.6. Suppose M ∈ Nets is a network such that nodes(M) is not empty. Then
M≡ N ‖> G for someN ∈ Nets and G ∈ G.
Proof. See Appendix A, Page 61.
We use the term generating networks to refer to elements of G. The import of Proposition
4.6 is that all non-trivial well-formed networks can be constructed from basic generating
networks, using ‖>.
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4.2. Testing Structures. The introduction of the composition operator ‖> allows the de-
velopment of a behavioural theory based on a probabilistic generalisation of the De Nicola
and Hennessy testing preorders [27]. In order to develop such a framework, we will exploit
the mathematical tools introduced in Section 2; our aim is to be able to relate networks
with different connection topologies.
In our framework, as has already been indicated, testing can be summarised as follows:
the network to be tested is composed with another one, usually called a testing network.
The composition of these two networks is then isolated from the external environment,
in the sense that no external agent (in our case nodes in the interface of the composed
network) can interfere with its behaviour; we will shortly present how such a task can be
accomplished. The composition of the two networks isolated from the external environment
takes the name of experiment.
Once these two operations (composition with a test and isolation from the external
environment) have been performed, the behaviour of the resulting experiment is analysed
to check whether there exists a computation that yields a state which is successful. This
task can be accomplished by relying on testing structures, which will be presented shortly.
At an informal level, successful states in our language coincide with those associated
with networks where at least the code running at one node has the special action ω enabled.
Since networks have probabilistic behaviour, each computation will be associated with the
probability of reaching a successful state; thus, every experiment will be associated with a
set of success probabilities, by quantifying over all its computation.
Let us now look at how the procedure explained above can be formalised; the topic
of composing networks has already been addressed in detail in Section 4.1, in which we
defined the operator ‖> and proved basic properties for it. To model experiments and their
behaviour, we rely on the following mathematical structure.
Definition 4.7. A Testing Structure (TS) is a triple 〈S,_, ω〉 where
(i) S is a set of states,
(ii) the relation _ is a subset of S ×D(S),
(iii) ω is a success predicate over S, that is ω : S → {true, false}.
Testing structures can be seen as (degenerate) pLTSs where the only possible action cor-
responds to the internal activity τ , and the transition
τ
−→ is defined to coincide with the
reduction relation _. Conversely every pLTS automatically determines a testing structure,
by concentrating on the relation
τ
−→.
Our goal is to turn a network into a testing structure. This amounts to defining, for
networks, a reduction relation and the success predicate ω. As we have mentioned in the
beginning of this section, when converting a network into a testing structure, we want to
make it isolated from the external environment.
When considering simpler process languages, like CCS or CSP (and, more generally,
their probabilistic counterparts), processes are converted into testing structures by identi-
fying the reduction relation with the internal activity τ ; that is, processes are not allowed
to synchronise with some external agent via a visible action.
Networks, however, are more complicated objects; here the nature of broadcast is non-
blocking, meaning that a broadcast can be fired by a node in a network without requiring
any synchronisation with a (possibly external) node. Thus we expect broadcast actions to
induce reductions when converting a network into a testing structure.
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On the other hand, input actions always originate from non-internal nodes. Hence they
can be seen as external activities which can influence the behaviour of a network. Therefore,
input actions should not be included in the definition of the reduction relation for networks.
Finally, the success predicate ω is defined to be true for exactly those networks in which
the success clause ω is enabled in at least one node.
Example 4.8. The main example of a TS is given by
〈Nets,_, ω〉
where
(i) (Γ✄M) _ (Γ✄∆) whenever
(a) Γ✄M
m.τ
−→∆ for some m ∈ nodes(M)
(b) or, Γ✄M
m.c!v
−→ ∆ for some value v, node name m and channel c
(ii)
ω(M) =
{
true, if M ≡M ′ | nJω + sK, for some s, n,M ′
false, otherwise
If ω(M) = true for some system term M , we say that a network Γ ✄M , where Γ is an
arbitrary connectivity graph, is ω-successful, or simply successful. Note that when recording
an ω-success we do not take into account the node involved.
As TSs can be seen as pLTSs, we can use in an arbitrary TS the various constructions intro-
duced in Section 2. Thus the reduction relation _ can be lifted to Dsub(sSys)×Dsub(sSys)
and we can make use of the concepts of hyper-derivatives and extreme-derivatives, intro-
duced in Section 2, to model fragments of executions and maximal executions of a testing
structure, respectively. Hyper-derivations in testing structures are denoted with the symbol
==✄, while we use the symbol ==✄≻ for extreme derivations.
Below we provide two simple examples that show how to reason about the behaviour
of the testing structures presented in Example 4.8.
Example 4.9. Consider the testing structure associated with the networkN in the center of
Figure 11, where the code q is given by the definition q ⇐ q 0.5⊕ c!〈v〉 .0. We can show that,
in the long run, this network will broadcast message v to the external location o by exhibiting
a hyper derivation for it which terminates in the point distribution ΓN ✄ kJc!〈v〉 .0K. If we
let N1 denote the configuration ΓN ✄ kJc!〈v〉 .0K, we have the following hyper-derivation:
N = 12 · N +
1
2 · N1
1
2 · N _
1
22
· N + 1
22
· N1
...
1
2n · N _
1
2n+1
· N + 1
2n+1
· N1
...
Let ∆′ =
∑∞
n=1
1
2n · N1. It is straightforward to check that ∆
′ = N1 and therefore we
have the hyper-derivation N ==✄ N1.
An arbitrary network N can be tested by another (testing) network T provided N ‖> T
is well-defined. Executions of the resulting testing structure will then be checked to establish
whether the network M satisfies a property the test was designed for; in such a case, the
testing component of an experiment will reach a ω-successful state.
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Executions, or maximal computations, correspond to extreme derivatives in the test-
ing structure associated with (N ‖> T ), as defined in Section 2. Since the framework is
probabilistic, each execution (that is extreme derivative) will be associated with a proba-
bility value, representing the probability that it will lead to an ω-successful state. Since the
framework is also nondeterministic the possible results of this test application is given by a
non-empty set of probability values.
Definition 4.10 (Tabulating results). The value of a sub-distribution in a TS is given by
the function V : Dsub(S)→ [0, 1], defined by V(∆) =
∑
{∆(s) | ω(s) = true }. Then the set
of possible results from a sub-distribution ∆ is defined by O(∆) = {V(∆′) | ∆ ==✄≻ ∆′ }.
Example 4.11. Let N be the network from Example 4.9 and consider the testing network
T given in Figure 11, where the code is determined by t ⇐ c?(x) .ω.0. It is easy to check
that N ‖> T is well-defined and is equal to Γ ✄ kJqK | oJtK, where Γ is the connectivity
graph containing the three nodes k, o, l and having the connections from Γ ⊢ k → o and
Γ ⊢ o ← t. So consider the testing structure associated with it; recall that we have the
definition q ⇐ q 0.5⊕ c!〈v〉 .0. For convenience let N1 = ΓN ✄ kJc!〈v〉 .0K as in the previous
example, N2 = ΓN ✄ kJ0K and Tω = ΓT ✄ oJω.0K. Then we have the following hyper-
derivation for N ‖> T :
N ‖> T _ (12 · N ‖> T +
1
2 · N1 ‖> T ) + ε
1
2 · N ‖> T +
1
2 · N1 ‖> T _ (
1
22
· N ‖> T + 1
22
· N1 ‖> T ) +
1
2 · N2 ‖> Tω
...
...
...
1
2n · N ‖> T +
1
2n · N1 ‖> T _ (
1
2n+1
· N ‖> T + 1
2n+1
· N1 ‖> T ) +
1
2n · N2 ‖> Tω
...
...
...
were we recall that ε denotes the empty sub-distribution, that is the one with ⌈ε⌉ = ∅. We
have therefore the hyper-derivation
N ‖> T ==✄ ε+
∞∑
n=1
1
2n
N2 ‖> Tω = N2 ‖> Tω.
Further, the above hyper-derivation satisfies the constraints required by ==✄≻ , defined
in Section 2, and therefore we have the extreme derivative N ‖> T ==✄≻ N2 ‖> Tω. Since
V(N2 ‖> Tω) = 1 we can therefore deduce that 1 ∈ O(N ‖> T ).
4.3. The behavioural preorders. We now combine the concepts of the previous two
sections to obtain our behavioural preorders. We have seen how to associate a non-empty
set of probabilities, tabulating the possible outcomes from applying the test T to the network
N . As explained in [7] there are two natural ways to compare such sets, optimistically or
pessimistically.
Definition 4.12 (Relating sets of outcomes). Let O1, O2 be two sets of values in [0, 1].
(i) The Hoare’s Preorder is defined by letting O1 ⊑H O2 whenever for any p1 ∈ O1 there
exists p2 ∈ O2 such that p1 ≤ p2.
(ii) The Smith’s Preorder is defined by letting O1 ⊑S O2 if for any p2 ∈ O2 there exists
p1 ∈ O1 such that p1 ≤ p2.
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Figure 7: A test
Given two networks M,N we can relate their behaviour, when extended with a testing
network T , by comparing the success outcomes of M ‖> T and N ‖> T (provided both
these networks are defined) via Definition 4.12. We can go further and consider what is the
relationship between such sets of outcomes with respect to all possible tests T which can
be used to extend the networks M,N .
Definition 4.13 (Testing networks). For M1, M2 ∈ Nets such that In(M1) = In(M2),
Out(M1) = Out(M2), we write
(1) M1 ⊑may M2 iff for every (testing) network T ∈ Nets such that both M1 ‖> T and
M2 ‖> T are defined, O(M1 ‖> T ) ⊑H O(M2 ‖> T ) .
(2) M1 ⊑must M2 iff for every (testing network) T ∈ Nets such that both M1 ‖> T and
M2 ‖> T are defined, O(M1 ‖> T ) ⊑S O(M2 ‖> T )
We use M1 =may M2 as an abbreviation for M1 ⊑may M2 and M2 ⊑may M1. The
relation =must is defined similarly. Finally, we say that M1 ⊑ M2 iff both M1 ⊑may M2
and M1 ⊑must M2 hold, and M1 ≃M2 iff M1 ⊑M2 and M2 ⊑M1.
Some explanation is necessary for the requirement on the interface of networks we have
placed in Definition 4.13. This constraint establishes that two networksM andN are always
distinguished if the sets of their input or output nodes differ. As we already mentioned,
external nodes can be seen as terminals that can be accessed by the external environment
to interact with the network. Roughly speaking, the constraint we have placed corresponds
to the intuition that the external environment can distinguish two networks M and N by
simply looking at the terminals that it can use to interact with these two networks.
Example 4.14. Consider the testing network
T = ΓT ✄ eJc!〈0〉K | o1Jd?(x) .c!〈x〉K | o2Jd?(x) .c!〈x〉K | oJc?(x) .c?(y) .ωK
where the connectivity is described in Figure 7. This can be used to test the networksM,N
from Example 3.1 in the testing structure of Example 4.8.
Intuitively the test sends the value 0 along the channel c at the node e, awaits for results
along the channel d at the nodes o1 and o2. These results are processed at node o, where
success might be announced.
The combined network (M ‖> T ) is deterministic in this TS, although probabilistic,
and so has only one extreme derivative; O(M ‖> T ) = {0.8}.
A similar calculation shows that O(N ‖> T ) = {0.81}; it therefore follows that N 6⊑may
M and M 6⊑must N .
Consider now the networks M1,M2 from Example 3.1. Here (M1 ‖> T ) is both prob-
abilistic and nondeterministic, and O(M1 ‖> T ) = { p | 0.5 ≤ p ≤ 1 }. Moreover we have
O(M ‖> T ) ⊑H O(M1 ‖> T ) .
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M = ΓM ✄mJc!〈v〉 .0K | nJc!〈v〉 .0K N = ΓN ✄mJc!〈v〉K
Figure 8: Broadcast vs Multicast
The combined network (M2 ‖> T ) is also deterministic, although it has limiting be-
haviour ; O(M2 ‖> T ) = {1}. Thus, in this case we have both O(M ‖> T ) ⊑H O(M2 ‖> T )
and O(M1 ‖> T ) ⊑H O(M2 ‖> T ). Further, we have that O(M1 ‖> T ) ⊑S O(M2 ‖> T ),
but O(M2 ‖> T ) 6⊑S O(M1 ‖> T ).
Example 4.15 (Broadcast vs Multicast). Consider the networks M and N in Figure 8.
Intuitively in N the value v is (simultaneously) broadcast to both nodes o1 and o2 while in
M there is a multicast. More specifically o1 receives v from modem while in an independent
broadcast o2 receives it from n.
This difference in behaviour can be detected (when we compare the networks optimisti-
cally) by the testing network
T = ΓT ✄ o1Jc?(x) .c!〈w〉 .0K | o2Jc?(x) .c?(y) .if y = 0 then 0 else ωK
assuming v is different than w; here we assume ΓT is the simple network which connects o1 to
o2. BothM ‖> T and N ‖> T are well-formed and note that they are both non-probabilistic.
Because N simultaneously broadcasts to o1 and o2 the second value received by o2 is
always w and therefore the test never succeeds; O(N ‖> T ) = {0}. On the other-hand there
is a possibility for the test succeeding when applied toM, 1 ∈ O(M ‖> T ). This is because
in M node m might first transmit v to o1 after which n transmits w to o2; now node n
might transmit the value v to o2 and assuming it is different than w we reach a success
state. It follows that M 6⊑may N .
Note that we can slightly modify the test T to show that we also have N 6⊑must N . To
this end, let
T ′ = ΓT ✄ o1Jc?(x) .c!〈0〉 .0K | o2Jc?(x) .c?(y) .if y = 0 then ω else 0K
In this case we have that O(M ‖> T ′) = {0, 1}, while O(N ‖> T ′) = {1}, and by definition
O(N ‖> T ′) 6⊑S O(M ‖> T ′).
One might also think it possible to use the difference between broadcast and multicast to
design a test T ′′ for which O(N ‖> T ′′) 6⊑H O(M ‖> T
′′) and O(M ‖> T ′′) 6⊑S O(N ‖> T
′′).
For example, if we let T ′′ = T ′ we obtain that 1 ∈ O(N ‖> T ′). This is because
because in N ‖> T ′ the second value received by o2 is always w. However we also have that
1 ∈ O(M ‖> T ′), since the simultaneous broadcast in N can be simulated by a multicast
in M, by node m first broadcasting to o1 followed by n broadcasting to o2. As this line of
reasoning is independent from the test T ′, it also applies to all those networks that can be
used to test the behaviour of M and N ; this leads to the intuition that N ⊑may M, which
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M = ΓM ✄mJAmK | nJAnK | kJAkK N = ΓN ✄mJBmK | kJAkK
Figure 9: Two networks with a common sub-network
m
n
k
m k k o
M1 = Γ1 ✄mJAmK | nJAnK N1 = Γ2 ✄mJBmK K = ΓK ✄ kJAkK
Figure 10: Decomposition of the networks M and N
will be proved formally later as a consequence of Example 6.4 and Theorem 6.2. Similarly,
Theorem 6.14 shows that M⊑must N .
One pleasing property of the behavioural preorders is that they allow compositional
reasoning over networks.
Proposition 4.16 (Compositionality). Let M1,M2 be two networks such that M1 ⊑may
M2 (M1 ⊑must M2), and let N be another network such that both (M1 ‖> N ) and (M2 ‖>
N ) are defined. Then (M1 ‖> N ) ⊑may (M2 ‖> N ) ((M1 ‖> N ) ⊑must (M2 ‖> N )).
Proof. A direct consequence of ‖> being both associative and interface preserving.
We end this section with an application of this compositionality result.
Example 4.17. Consider the networks M and N in Figure 9, where the codes at the
various nodes are given by
Am ⇐ c!〈v〉 .0
An ⇐ c?(x) .d!〈w〉 .0
Ak ⇐ c?(x) .d?(y) .e!〈u〉 .0
Bm ⇐ c!〈v〉 .d!〈w〉 .0
It is possible to write both of them respectively asM1 ‖> K and N1 ‖> K, where the networks
M1,N1 and K are depicted in Figure 10. In order to prove thatM⊑may N (N ⊑must M),
it is therefore sufficient to focus on their respective sub-networks M1 and N1, and prove
M1 ⊑may N1 (N1 ⊑must M1). The equivalence of the two original networks will then follow
from a direct application of Proposition 4.16.
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M = ΓM ✄ lJpK N = ΓN ✄ kJqK T = ΓT ✄ oJtK
Figure 11: A problem with the composition operator
4.4. Justifying the operator ‖>. Here we revisit Definition 4.3 and in particular investi-
gate the possibility of using alternative composition operators. The remainder of the paper
is independent of this section and so it may be safely skipped by the uninterested reader.
Here we take a more general approach to composition; rather than give a particular
operator we discuss natural properties we would expect of such operators. Let us just pre-
suppose a consistency predicate P on pairs of networks determining when their composition
should be defined. The only requirement onMPN is that whenever it is defined the result-
ing composite network is well-formed. Since the composite network should be determined
by that of its components this amounts to requiring that
P(M,N ) implies nodes(M) ∩ nodes(N ) = ∅ for any M,N ∈ Nets (4.4)
Given a consistency predicate satisfying (4.4) we can now generalise Definition 4.3 to give
a range of different composition operators.
Definition 4.18 (General composition of networks). Let P be a consistency predicate on
networks in Nets satisfying (4.4). Then we define the associated partial composition relation
by:
(ΓM ✄M) 9P (ΓN ✄N) =
{
(ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (M |N), if P((ΓM ✄M), (ΓN ✄N))
undefined, otherwise
The connectivity graph ΓM ∪ ΓN is defined as in Definition 4.3.
Example 4.19. Let Ps be the partialss binary predicate defined by letting Ps(M,N )
whenever
• nodes(M) ∩ nodes(N ) = ∅
• M ⊢ m→ n if and only if N ⊢ m→ n, for every m ∈ nodes(M) and n ∈ nodes(N ),
• M ⊢ m← n if and only if N ⊢ m← n, for every m ∈ nodes(M) and n ∈ nodes(N ),
By definition this satisfies the requirement (4.4) above, and intuitively it only allows the
composition whenever the two individual networks agree on the interconnections between
internal and external nodes.
For notational convenience we denote the operator 9Ps with ‖. It is easy to check that
this operator is both associative and commutative.
Thus a priori this composition operator ‖ could equally well be used to develop the
testing theory in Section 4.3. Unfortunately the resulting theory would be degenerate.
Example 4.20 (Example 4.19 continued). Consider the networksM,N in Figure 11, where
we choose p = c!〈v〉 and q = c!〈w〉 for two different values v,w. Then intuitively M and
N should have different observable behaviour, observable by placing a test at the node o.
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However if the operator ‖ is used to combine a test with the network being observed they
are indistinguishable.
This is because if there is a network T such that M ‖ T and N ‖ T are well-defined
then o can not be in nodes(T ). For if o were in nodes(T ), then since M ⊢ l → o the
definition of the operator implies that T ⊢ l → o. This in turn implies that N ⊢ l → o,
which is not true.
Now since no testing network which can be applied to both M and N can place any
code at o, no difference can be discovered between them.
The question now naturally arises about which consistency predicate P lead to reason-
able composition operators 9Ps , in the sense that at least the resulting testing theories are
not degenerate. We want to be able to compare networks with different connectivity graphs,
and possibly different nodes, such as M and N in Figure 11. We also should not be able
to change the connectivity of the internal nodes of a network when we test it; we wish to
implement black-box testing, where the nodes containing running code cannot be accessed
directly.
These informal requirements can be formulated as natural requirements on composition
operators. The first says that the composed network is completely determined by the
components:
(I) Merge: the operator 9 should be determined by some predicate P using Definition 4.3.
Intuitively the interface of a network is how their external behaviour is to be observed.
Since our aim is to enable compositional reasoning over networks, we would expect compo-
sition to preserve interfaces:
(II) Interface preservation: If In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ) and T can be com-
posed with both, that is both M 9 T and N 9 T are well-defined, then In(M 9 T ) =
In(N 9 T ), Out(M 9 T ) = Out(N 9 T ).
The final requirement captures the intuitive idea that reorganising the internal structure
of a network should not affect the ability to perform a test; in fact the reorganisation is
simply a renaming of nodes. Let σ be a permutation of node names. We use (Γ✄M)σ to
denote the result of applying σ to the node names in M and in the connectivity graph Γ.
(III) Renaming: SupposeM9 T is defined. ThenMσ 9 T is also defined, provided σ is
a node permutation which satisfies
• σ(e) = e for every e ∈ Intf(M)
• no n ∈ nodes(T ) appears in the range of σ; that is n ∈ nodes(T ) implies σ(n) = n.
Example 4.21. The operator ‖ does not satisfy (III), as can be seen using the simple
networks in Figure 11; M ‖ T is obviously well-defined. However, consider the renaming σ
which swaps node names l to k, which is valid with respect to T ; the network Mσ ‖ T is
not defined, as ΓT 6⊢ k → o. A slight modification will demonstrate that interfaces are also
not preserved by this operator.
Proposition 4.22. Suppose 9 satisfies the conditions (I) - (III) above. Then nodes(M) ∩
Intf(N ) = ∅ whenever M 9N is defined.
Proof. By contradiction; let M = ΓM ✄M and N = ΓN ✄ N . Assume that m is a node
included in nodes(M) ∩ Intf(N ), and that M9N is defined. Finally, let σ be an arbitrary
permutation such that Mσ 9N is defined. Note that the following statements are true:
(1) m /∈ nodes(N ),
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(2) N ⊢ m,
(3) Intf(M) = Intf(Mσ).
(4) m /∈ Intf(M 9N ).
For proving the last statement just note that m ∈ nodes(M) by hypothesis, hence m ∈
nodes(M 9N ). By definition of interface it follows that m /∈ Intf(M 9N ).
Let l be a node which is not contained in ΓM , nor in ΓN . Consider the permutation
σ which swaps nodes m and l; that is σ(m) = l, σ(l) = m and σ(k) = k for all k 6= m, l.
Since M 6⊢ l we also have that l /∈ nodes(M), so that σ(l) = m /∈ nodes(Mσ). Further, the
permutation σ is consistent with condition (III), renaming, when applied to networks M
and N ; therefore Mσ 9N is defined.
Since m /∈ nodes(Mσ), by (1) above it follows that m /∈ nodes(Mσ 9 N ); by (2), we
obtain that (ΓM )σ ∪ ΓN ⊢ m. These two statements ensure that m ∈ Intf(Mσ 9N ).
As a direct consequence of (3) and condition (II), interface preservation, we also have that
m ∈ Intf(M 9N ), but this contradicts (4).
Corollary 4.23. Let 9 be any symmetric composition operator which satisfies the conditions
(I) - (III). Suppose M1 9M2 is well-defined, and of the form Γ✄M . Then Γ ⊢ m1 6⇄ m2
whenever mi ∈ nodes(Mi).
Proof. A simple consequence of the previous result.
What this means is that if we use such a symmetric operator when applying a test to a
network, as in Definition 4.7, then the resulting testing preorder will be degenerate; it will
not distinguish between any pair of nets. In some sense this result is unsurprising. For T
to test M in M 9 T it must have code running at the interface of M. But, as we have
seen, condition (III) more or less forbids T to have code running at the interface of M.
Thus we have ruled out the possibility of basing our testing theory on a symmetric
composition operator. The question now remains what composition operator is the most
appropriate? We have already stated that conditions (I)-(III) are natural, and since there
are no further obvious requirements we could choose the operator with greatest expressive
power among those that satisfy conditions (I)-(III). Here an operator 9P1 is more expressive
than another 9P2 if, whenever M 9P1 N is defined for any two arbitrary networks M,N ,
then so is M 9P2 N , and the result of the two compositions above is the same. The next
Lemma shows that the operator which we are looking for is exactly ‖>.
Lemma 4.24. Let P be any consistency predicate satisfying (4.4) above. Then if M9P N
is defined so is M ‖> N and moreover M 9P N = M ‖> N .
Proof. Obvious from the definition of ‖> in Definition 4.3.
5. Extensional Semantics
As explained in papers such as [30, 18], contextual equivalences and preorders are deter-
mined by so-called extensional actions, which consist of the observable activities which a
system can have with its external environment. We present an extensional Semantics for
probabilistic wireless networks in Section 5.1. The final two sections develop technical prop-
erties of these actions, which will be used in the later soundness proofs. They may be safely
skipped at first reading. Section 5.2 is devoted to basic decomposition and composition
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results for extensional actions, while in Section 5.3 we relate the extensional actions we
introduced with the reduction relation of the testing structures associated with networks.
5.1. Extensional Actions. Here we design a pLTS whose set of actions can be detected
(hence tested) by the external environment. The intensional semantics in Section 3 already
provides a pLTS and it is instructive to see why this is not appropriate.
ConsiderM and N from Figure 11, and suppose further that the code p and q, running
at l and k respectively, is identical, c!〈v〉. Then we would expect M and N to be be-
haviourally indistinguishable. However M will have an output action, labelled l.c!v, which
is not possible for N . So output actions cannot record their source node. What turns out
to be important is the set of target nodes. For example if in M we added a new output
node m to the interface, with a connection from l then we would be able to distinguish M
from N ; the required test would simply place some appropriate testing code at the new
node m.
Now we present an extensional semantics for networks; here the visible actions consist
of activities which can be detected (hence tested) by placing code at the interface of a
network. In this semantics we have internal, input and output actions.
Definition 5.1 (Extensional actions). The actions of the extensional semantics are defined
as follows:
(1) internal, (Γ✄M) τ7−−→ (Γ✄∆); some internal activity reduces the system M , relative
to the connectivity Γ, to some system N , where N ∈ ⌈∆⌉. Here the internal activity of a
network coincides either with some node performing a silent move m.τ or broadcasting
a value which cannot be detected by any node in the interface of the network itself.
Formally, (Γ✄M) τ7−−→ (Γ✄∆) whenever M 6≡ mJω + sK |N and
(a) Γ✄M
m.τ
−→∆
(b) or Γ✄M
n.c!v
−→∆ for some value v, channel c and node name n satisfying Γ ⊢ n→ m
implies m ∈ nodes(M)
Note that we are using the notation given in Section 3 for defining distributions. Here
∆ is a distribution over sSys and so (Γ ✄ ∆) is a distribution over networks; however
all networks in its support use the same network connectivity Γ.
(2) input, (Γ ✄M) n.c?v7−−−−−→ (Γ ✄ ∆); an observer placed at node n can send the value v
along the channel c to the network (Γ ✄M). For the observer to be able to place the
code at node n we must have n ∈ In(Γ✄M).
Formally (Γ✄M) n.c?v7−−−−−→ (Γ✄∆) whenever M 6≡ mJω + sK |N and
(a) Γ✄M
n.c?v
−→ ∆
(b) n ∈ In(Γ✄M)
(3) output, (Γ ✄M)
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ (Γ ✄∆), where η is a non-empty set of nodes; an observer
placed at any node n ∈ η can receive the value v along the channel c. For this to happen
each node n ∈ η must be in Out(Γ✄M), and there must be some code running at some
node in M which can broadcast along channel c to each such n.
Formally, (Γ✄M)
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ (Γ✄∆) whenever M 6≡ mJω + sK |N
(i) (Γ✄M)
m.c!v
−→ ∆ for some node m
(ii) η = {n ∈ Out(Γ✄M) | Γ ⊢ m→ n } 6= ∅.
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In the following we will use the metavariable λ to range over extensional actions. These
actions endow the set of networks with the structure of a pLTS. Thus the terminology
used for pLTSs is extended to networks, so that in the following we will use terms such as
finitary networks or finite branching networks; we use the symbol |===⇒ to denote hyper-
derivations in the extensional pLTS of networks, and |==⇒≻ to denote extreme derivations.
Also note that we allow an extensional actions to be performed only in the case that a
network is not ω-successful. As we have already stated, we see pLTSs as non-deterministic
probabilistic experiments whose success is obtained by reaching an ω-successful state. When
an ω-successful state is reached, we require the experiment to terminate.
A trivial application of Corollary 3.6 ensures that extensional actions are preserved by
structurally congruent networks. Further, they do not change the topological structure of
a network.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that Γ ✄ M λ7−−→ ∆, ∆ ∈ D(Nets). Then ∆ = Γ ✄ Θ, and
Θ ∈ D(sSys) is node stable. Further, for any N ∈ ⌈∆⌉ we have that nodes(N ) = nodes(M).
Proof. The definition of extensional actions ensures that whenever Γ ✄ M λ7−−→ ∆ then
∆ = Γ✄Θ for some Θ ∈ D(sSys). The fact that for any N ∈ ⌈Θ⌉ we have that nodes(M) =
nodes(N) follows from Corollary 3.8.
Note that, if two distributions ∆,Θ ∈ D(Nets) are node-stable, ifM ‖> N is defined for
someM∈ ⌈∆⌉,N ∈ ⌈Θ⌉, thenM′ ‖> N ′ is defined for anyM′ ∈ ⌈∆⌉,M′ ∈ ⌈Θ⌉. Thus, for
node-stable distributions of networks it makes sense to lift the operator ‖> to distributions
of networks, defined directly via an application of Equation 2.2. A similar argument holds
for the symmetric operator ‖.
In the following we will need weak versions of extensional actions, which abstract from
internal activity, provided by the relation τ7−−→. Internal activity can be modelled by the
hyper-derivation relation |===⇒, which is a probabilistic generalisation of the more standard
weak internal relation τ7−−→
∗
.
Definition 5.3 (Weak extensional actions). (1) Let M
τ
|==⇒ ∆ whenever we have the
hyper-derivation M |===⇒ ∆
(2) M
n.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆ whenever M |===⇒ n.c?v7−−−−−→|===⇒ ∆
(3) Let M
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆ be the least relation satisfying:
(a) M |===⇒
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→|===⇒ ∆ implies M
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆
(b) M
c!v✄η1|======⇒ ∆′, ∆′
c!v✄η2|======⇒ ∆, where η1 ∩ η2 = ∅, implies M
c!v✄(η1∪η2)|=========⇒ ∆
These weak actions endow the set of networks Nets with the structure of another pLTS,
called the extensional pLTS and denoted by pLTSNets.
Some explanation is necessary for the non-standard definition of output actions in
Definition 5.3(3). Informally speaking, the definition of weak extensional output actions
expresses the capability of simulating broadcast through multicast, which has already been
observed in Example 4.15. A single (weak) broadcast action detected by a set of nodes η can
be matched by a sequence of weak broadcast actions , detected respectively by η1, · · · , ηi ⊆
η, provided that the collection {η1, · · · , ηi} is a partition of η. This constraint is needed to
ensure that
(i) every node in η will detect the transmitted value and
(ii) no node in η will detect the value more than once.
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M = ΓM ✄mJc!〈v〉K N = ΓN ✄ oJc?(x) .0K
Figure 12: A problem with decomposition of actions with respect to ‖>
As we will see in Section 6, the ability of a multicast to simulate a broadcast is captured
by the testing preorders. Roughly speaking, in a generic network M a broadcast can be
converted into a multicast3 leading to a network N such that M ⊑may N . Conversely, in
the must-testing setting a multicast in a networkM can be replaced by a broadcast leading
to a network N such that M⊑must N .
5.2. Composition and Decomposition Results. In this Section we prove decomposition
and composition results for the extensional actions introduced in the previous section. In
its most general form, the results we want to develop can be summarised as follows: given
a network M ‖> N ,
Strong Decomposition: for actions of the form (M ‖> N ) λ7−−→ Λ we want to determine
two actions of the form M
λ17−−−→ ∆ and N
λ27−−−→ Θ, where (∆ ‖> Θ) = Λ,
Weak Composition: conversely, given two actions of the form M
λ1|===⇒ ∆ and N
λ2|===⇒
Θ, we want to determine an action of the form (∆ ‖> Θ)
λ
|==⇒ (∆ 9Θ).
Unfortunately, the following example shows that this task cannot be achieved by relying
solely on the extensional semantics.
Example 5.4. Consider the networks M,N of Figure 12. It is straightforward to note
that M ‖> N is defined; further, (M ‖> N )
τ
|==⇒ (M′ ‖> N ′), where M′ = (ΓM ✄mJ0K),
N ′ = (ΓN ✄ oJ0K).
One could wish to be able to infer this action from the broadcast action of the form
M
c!v✄{o}
7−−−−−−→ M′ and an input action of the form N m.c?v7−−−−−→ N ′. Unfortunately, this last
action cannot be inferred, since in N node o cannot detect the broadcasts performed by
node m.
The problem of Example 5.4 arises because the connection between from node m to
node n, which is present inM ‖> N , is not present in the right hand side of the composition
N . As a consequence, the action N m.c?v7−−−−−→ N ′ cannot be derived. However, note that we
could still decompose the transition M ‖> N τ7−−→M′ ‖> N ′ if we were to focus on the code
run by node o in N , rather than on the network N itself.
Example 5.5. Consider again the networks M,N of Figure 12, and recall that N =
ΓN ✄ oJc?(x) .0K. Given the actionM ‖> N τ7−−→M′ ‖> N ′, where we recall that N ′ = oJ0K,
we can now infer the extensional transition M
c!v✄{o}
7−−−−−−→ M′ and the process transition
c?(x) .0 c?v−→0.
3 Note that this operation would require a change in the internal topology ofM.
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The first transitions says that some node inM performs a broadcast which affects node
o, while the second one says that how the code which node o is running reacts to a broadcast.
Therefore, it is not surprising to note that the two transitionsM
c!v✄{o}
7−−−−−−→M′ and P
c?v
−→0
can be combined together to obtain the original transition M ‖> N τ7−−→M′ ‖> N ′.
Example 5.5 leads us to the intuition that composition and decomposition results of
extensional actions can be developed if we focus on composed networks of the formM ‖> G,
where G ∈ G. Intuitively, such results can be obtained by reasoning on the extensional
transitions of M and the process transitions performed by the only internal node in G.
Proposition 5.6 (Strong decomposition in pLTSNets). Let M ∈ Nets,G ∈ G be two net-
works such that M ‖> G is defined. Further, let ΓN , n, s be such that G = (ΓN ✄ nJsK);
Suppose M ‖> G λ7−−→ Λ, Λ ∈ D(Nets). Then Λ = ∆ ‖> (ΓN✄nJΘK for some ∆,Θ ∈ D(Nets)
such that
(1) if λ = τ then either
(i) M τ7−−→ ∆, Θ = s, or
(ii) ∆ =M and s
τ
−→Θ, or
(iii) M
c!v✄{n}
7−−−−−−→ ∆, s
c?v
−→Θ, or
(iv) M
c!v✄{n}
7−−−−−−→ ∆, s 6
c?v
−−→ and Θ = s, or
(v) Out(G) = ∅, M n.c?v7−−−−−→ ∆, s
c!v
−→Θ, or
(vi) Out(G) = ∅, n /∈ In(M), ∆ =M and s
c!v
−→Θ.
(2) if λ = c!v ✄ η then either
(i) M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆, n /∈ η and Θ = s, or
(ii) M
c!v✄η∪{n}
7−−−−−−−−→ ∆, n /∈ η and s
c?v
−→Θ, or
(iii) M
c!v✄η∪{n}
7−−−−−−−−→ ∆, n /∈ η, s 6
c?v
−−→ and Θ = s, or
(iv) M n.c?v7−−−−−→ ∆, s
c!v
−→Θ and η = Out(G), or
(v) n /∈ In(M), ∆ =M, s
c!v
−→Θ and η = Out(G),
(3) if λ = m.c?v, where m 6= n, then either
(i) M m.c?v7−−−−−→ ∆, Θ = s and m /∈ In(G), or
(ii) ∆ =M, m /∈ In(M), s
c?v
−→Θ, or
(iii) ∆ =M, m /∈ In(M), s 6
c?v
−−→ and Θ = s, or
(iv) M m.c?v7−−−−−→ ∆, s
c?v
−→Θ and m ∈ In(G), or
(v) M m.c?v7−−−−−→ ∆, s 6
c?v
−−→ and Θ = s.
Proof. The proof of this Proposition is quite technical, and it is therefore relegated to
Appendix B, Page 63.
Next we consider how the weak actions performed by a stable sub-distribution of the
form ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK), can be inferred by a weak action performed by the node-stable
distribution ∆ and a process transition performed by the state s, respectively. For our
purposes it will suffice to combine a weak extensional transition with a strong process
transition.
Proposition 5.7 (Weak/Strong composition in pLTSNets). Let ∆ ∈ Dsub(Nets) be a node-
stable sub-distributions of networks. Let also ΓN , n, s be such that ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK) is
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well-defined. Further, let G ∈ ⌈ΓN ✄ nJsK⌉; here note that the sets Out(G) and In(G) are
completely determined by the connectivity graph ΓN .
(1) Composition resulting in internal activity:
(i) ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK),
(ii) s
τ
−→Θ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK),
(iii) ∆
c!v✄{n}
|======⇒ ∆′ and s
c?v
−→Θ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘ
′K),
(iv) ∆
c!v✄{n}
|======⇒ ∆′ and s 6
c?v
−−→ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK),
(v) ∆
n.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′, Out(G) = ∅ and s
c!v
−→Θ, then , then ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJΘK),
(vi) for any M ∈ ⌈∆⌉, n /∈ In(M), Out(G) = ∅ and s
c!v
−→ Θ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄
nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK).
(2) Composition resulting in an extensional output:
(i) ∆
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′, n /∈ η implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK),
(ii) ∆
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′, {n} ⊂ η and s
c?v
−→Θ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η\{n}
|========⇒ ∆′ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJΘK),
(iii) ∆
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′, {n} ⊂ η and s 6
c?v
−−→ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η\{n}
|========⇒ ∆′ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJsK),
(iv) s
c!v
−→ Θ, Out(G) 6= ∅, ∆
n.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′ implies that ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄Out(G)
|========⇒
∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK),
(v) n /∈ In(M) for any M ∈ ⌈∆⌉ and s
c!v
−→ Θ′, Out(G) 6= ∅ implies that ∆ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄Out(G)
|========⇒ ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK).
(3) Composition resulting in an input:
(i) ∆
m.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′ and m /∈ In(G) implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄nJsK)
m.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄nJsK,
(ii) m /∈ In(M) forM∈ ⌈∆⌉, m ∈ In(G) and s
c?v
−→Θ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN✄nJsK)
m.c?v
|=====⇒
∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK,
(iii) m /∈ In(M) forM ∈ ⌈∆⌉, m ∈ In(G) and s 6
c?v
−−→ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN✄nJsK)
m.c?v
|=====⇒
∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK,
(iv) ∆
m.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′, m ∈ In(G) and s
c?v
−→ Θ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
m.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJΘK,
(v) ∆
m.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′, m ∈ In(G) and s 6
c?v
−−→ implies ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
m.c?v
|=====⇒ ∆′ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJΘK.
Proof. See Appendix B, Page 65.
5.3. Relating Extensional Actions and Reductions. In this section we investigate the
relationship between extensional actions and reductions, defined in Section 4.2.
It follows immediately, from the definition of the reduction relation _, that for any
network M we have M _ ∆ if and only if either M τ7−−→ ∆ or M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆. However,
this result is not true anymore if we focus on the extensional transitions performed by a
distribution of networks.
Example 5.8 (Reductions and Extensional Actions). Consider the network distribution
Γ✄∆, where Γ is depicted in Figure 13 and
∆ = 1/2 ·mJτ.0K + 1/2 ·mJc!〈v〉 .0K.
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Figure 13: Relating reductions with extensional actions.
Note that we have the reductions Γ✄mJτ.0K _ Γ✄mJ0K, and Γ✄mJc!〈v〉 .0K _ Γ✄mJ0K.
These two reductions can be combined together to infer Γ✄∆ _ Γ✄mJ0K.
However, there exists no extensional action of the form Γ✄∆ λ7−−→ Γ✄mJ0K; in fact,
the only possibility for the network Γ✄mJτ.0K is to perform a τ -extensional action, while
the network Γ ✄mJc!〈v〉 .0K can only perform an output action of the form c!v ✄ {o}. In
order to infer the action Γ ✄ ∆ λ7−−→ Γ ✄mJ0K we require that every network in ⌈Γ✄∆⌉
performs the same action λ; but as we have just noted, this is not true for Γ✄∆.
The problem in Example 5.8 arises because reductions have been identified with two
different activities of networks; internal actions and broadcasts of messages. However, it
is possible to avoid this problem if we modify a network M by removing the nodes in its
interface. As a consequence, the only activities allowed for such a network would be internal
actions of the form τ .
Definition 5.9 (Closure of a Network). LetM be a network; we define its closure cl(M) =
M′ by letting
(M′)V = MV \ Intf(M)
M′ ⊢ m,n,M ⊢ m→ n implies M′ ⊢ m→ n
Obviously the operator cl(·) preserves well-formed networks.
The actions of a network of the form cl(M) are completely determined by those per-
formed by M, as the following result shows.
Proposition 5.10. Suppose that M λ7−−→ ∆, where either λ = τ or λ = c!v ✄ η; then
cl(M) τ7−−→ cl(∆).
Conversely, if cl(M) λ7−−→ Θ, then λ = τ and either
(i) M τ7−−→ ∆ and Θ = cl(∆),
(ii) or M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆ and Θ = cl(∆).
Proof. Let M = Γ ✄M . Suppose that Γ ✄M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ Γ ✄ ∆ for some Γ,M and ∆ ∈
D(sSys). By definition of extensional actions there exists a node m ∈ nodes(M) such
that Γ ✄ M
m.c!v
−→ ∆, and {o | Γ ⊢ m → o} = η. By Proposition 3.5 it follows that
M ≡ mJc!e.p+ qK |N , with JeK = v. By definition of the operator cl(·), cl(Γ✄M) = Γ′✄M ,
where Γ′ ⊢ m → n whenever Γ ⊢ m → n and m,n ∈ nodes(M). By an application of
propositions 3.5 and 3.4 we obtain that Γ′ ✄M
m.c!v
−→ ∆4. By Definition 5.1(1) we get that
Γ′✄M τ7−−→ Γ′✄∆. But Γ′✄∆ is exactly cl(Γ✄∆). The case Γ✄M τ7−−→ Γ✄∆ is treated
similarly.
4In reality these propositions ensure that Γ′✄M
m.c!v
−→ ∆′, where ∆′ ≡ ∆. However, since the system term
M is not changed when performing the operation cl(Γ✄M), it can be proved that ∆ = ∆′.
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Conversely, suppose that Γ′ ✄ M λ7−−→ Γ′ ✄ Θ. Since Intf(Γ′ ✄ M) = ∅, it follows
that it cannot be λ = m.c?v, nor λ = c!v ✄ η. Therefore the only possibility is that
Γ′ ✄M τ7−−→ Γ′ ✄Θ. By Definition 5.1(1) there are two possible cases.
(1) Γ′ ✄M
m.τ
−→Θ. In this case we have that M ≡ mJτ.p + qK |N and Θ ≡ P(mJpK) |N . It
follows that Γ ⊢M
m.τ
−→Θ, hence Γ✄M m.τ7−−−−→ Γ✄Θ.
(2) Γ′ ✄M
m.c!v
−→ Θ; in this case we have that Γ✄M
m.c!v
−→ Θ, since whenever Γ′ ⊢ m→ n it
also follows that Γ ⊢ m → n. Let η = {o ∈ Out(Γ ✄M) | Γ ⊢ m → o}. If η = ∅, by
Definition 5.1(1) we obtain that Γ✄M τ7−−→ Γ✄Θ, otherwise Definition 5.1(2) ensures
that Γ✄M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ Γ✄Θ.
Thus only τ -actions are allowed in networks of the form cl(M), and the extensional outputs
performed byM are converted in τ -actions in cl(M). This relationship can be used to relate
the reductions performed by the network M with the extensional actions of the network
cl(M)
Proposition 5.11. Let Γ′✄M = cl(Γ✄M); then Γ✄M _ Γ✄∆ if and only if Γ′✄M _
Γ′ ✄∆.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 5.10 and the definition of reductions.
Corollary 5.12. Let Γ′✄M = cl(Γ✄M); then Γ✄M ==✄ Γ✄∆ if and only if Γ′✄M ==✄
Γ′ ✄∆. Further, Γ✄M ==✄≻ Γ✄∆ if and only if Γ′ ✄M ==✄≻ Γ✄∆.
An important consequence of Corollary 5.12 is that the operator cl(·) does not affect
the set of outcomes of a network.
Corollary 5.13. For any network M, O(M) = O(cl(M)).
Proof. LetM = Γ✄M , cl(M) = Γ′✄M . Suppose that p ∈ O(M). Then Γ✄M ==✄≻ Γ✄∆,
and
∑
N∈⌈∆⌉ V(∆) = p. By Corollary 5.12 we have that Γ
′
✄ M ==✄≻ Γ′ ✄ ∆, hence
p =
∑
N∈⌈∆⌉ V(∆) ∈ O(Γ
′
✄M).
The converse implication is proved analogously.
Thus the operator cl(·) allows to relate weak extensional actions and reductions without
affecting the set of outcomes of a network. As we will see in Section 6, this operator is very
helpful when exhibiting sound proof methods for the testing preorders.
6. A Sound Proof Method for the Testing Preorders
In this Section we present the main results of the paper. Following [7] we introduce the
notion of simulation between networks M ✁
sim
N , and we prove that it is a sound proof
technique for the may-testing preorder. This topic is addressed in Section 6.1.
In Section 6.2 we give a similar result for the must testing relation. We introduce the
concepts deadlocked network and terminal distributions. These will be used to define a
novel coinductive relation for sub-distribution of networks, the deadlock simulation ⊑DS.
We prove that the inverse of this relation is sound with respect to the must-testing preorder
⊑must. Here the use of sub-distributions is necessary, since the must-testing preorder is
sensitive to divergence.
Finally, in Section 6.3 we focus on convergent networks; We show that for such networks
a slight variation of deadlock simulations can be used as a sound proof method for both the
may and must testing preorders.
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6.1. The May Case. We begin this section by reviewing the standard definition of simu-
lations for probabilistic systems, applied to our calculus of probabilistic networks.
Definition 6.1 (Simulation preorder). In pLTSNets we let ✁sim denote the largest relation
in Nets× Nets such that if M ✁
sim
N then:
• In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ),
• if ω(M) = true, then N
τ
=⇒Θ′ such that for every L ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉, ω(L) = true,
• otherwise, whenever M
λ
|==⇒ ∆, for λ ∈ Actτ , then there is a Θ ∈ D(Nets) such that
N
λ
|==⇒ Θ and ∆ (✁
sim
)e Θ.
This is a mild generalisation of the corresponding definition in [7] where we factor in the
presence of the success predicate ω( ) and we compare only networks with the same input
and output nodes.
Our aim in this Section is to prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.2 (Soundness for May-testing). Suppose N1, N2 are finitary networks. Then
N1 ✁sim N2 in pLTSNets implies N1 ⊑may N2.
Before proving Theorem 6.2, let us review, this time with formal arguments, why our
definition of weak extensional actions had to be so complicated, and why we decided to
focus on well-formed networks.
Example 6.3 (On Well-formed Networks). Consider again the networksM,N of Example
4.1. Here we recall that N is not well-formed, as it has a connection between the two
external nodes o1, o2.
Let (✁
sim
)′ be the largest relation over (possibly non well-formed) networks which
satisfies the requirements of Definition 6.1. It is immediate to show that M(✁
sim
)′N ,
However, M 6⊑may N In fact, it suffices to consider the test T = ΓT ✄ o1Jc?(x) .c!〈w〉K |
o2Jc?(x) .c?(y) .ωK, where ΓT ⊢ o1, o2 and ΓT ⊢ o1 6→ o2 to distinguish these two networks.
Specifically O(M ‖> T ) = {0}, O(N ‖> T ) = {1}, and {0} 6⊑H {1}. Therefore, Theorem 6.2
cannot be extended to non well-formed networks.
Example 6.4. Consider the networks M and N in Figure 8, discussed already in Exam-
ple 4.15. It is easy to show that both of them can perform the weak extensional action
c!v✄{o1,o2}|=========⇒. However, the inference of the action is different for the individual networks;
while in network N it is implied by the execution of a single broadcast action, detected by
both nodes o1 and o2 simultaneously, inM this is implied by a sequence of weak extensional
actions M
c!v✄{o1}|=======⇒
c!v✄{o2}|=======⇒.
It is therefore possible to exhibit a simulation between N and M, thus showing that
N ✁
sim
M; Theorem 6.2 shows that this implies N ⊑may M.
Example 6.5. Soundness requires that the extensional output actions records the set of
target nodes, rather than single nodes. Consider the networksM,N depicted in Figure 14,
where M = mJc!〈v〉+ c?(x) .0K | nJc!〈v〉+ c?(x) .0K and N = mJc!〈v〉K. Intuitively, network
M can broadcast value v to either node l1 or node l2, but it cannot broadcast the message
to both nodes. On the other hand, in N node m can broadcast value v simultaneously to
both nodes l1 and l2.
Note thatN 6⊑may M because of the test T given in Figure 14, where T = l1Jc?(x) .c!〈x〉K|
l2Jc?(x) .c!〈x〉K | oJc?(x) .c?(y) .ωK. In fact, in (N ‖> T ) both nodes l1 and l2 will receive the
broadcast of value v along channel c performed by node m; each of these nodes will forward
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Figure 14: Ensuring soundness
the received value to node o. Therefore, node o will receive two values, one from node l1
and one from node l2, after which it will reach a successful state. That is, 1 ∈ O(N ‖> T ).
On the other hand, none of the computations of (M ‖> T ) leads to a successful config-
uration. There are in fact two possibilities; either node m broadcasts value v to nodes n
and l1, or node n broadcasts value v to nodes m and l2. Note that one of the effects of node
m (respectively n) broadcasting value v is that of preventing node n (respectively m) from
performing a second broadcast. As a consequence, only one among nodes l1, l2 will receive
value v along channel c. When node l1 (respectively l2) receives value v, it will forward it
to node o. After this broadcast has been performed the network reaches a configuration in
which node o is still waiting to receive a value along channel c before entering a successful
state; further, the computation of the network cannot proceed anymore, since none of its
nodes can perform a broadcast. There are no other possible behaviours ofM ‖> T , therefore
we obtain O(M ‖> T ) = {0}.
Since 1 ∈ O(N ‖> T ), but 1 /∈ O(M ‖> T ), it follows that N 6⊑may M.
We also have N 6✁
sim
M because N can perform the output action labelled c!v✄{l1, l2},
which can not be matched by M.
However suppose we were to restrict η in the definition of extensional output actions,
part (3) of Definition 5.1, to be singleton sets of node names. Then in the resulting pLTS
it is easy to check that M can simulate N . The broadcast of value v in network N , which
can be detected by both nodes l1 and l2, can be matched by either the broadcast performed
by node m (which can be detected by node l1) or by the broadcast performed by node n
(which can be detected by node l2) inM. In other words, with the proposed simplification
the resulting simulations would not be sound; that is, Theorem 6.2 would no longer hold.
Let us now turn to the proof of Theorem 6.2; it relies on the following two technical
results, whose proofs are developed in Section 7.
Theorem 6.6 (Compositionality). Let M,N be finitary networks such that In(M) =
In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ). Also, suppose L is a network such that both M ‖> L and
N ‖> L are defined. Then M ✁
sim
N implies (M ‖> L) ✁
sim
(N ‖> L).
Proof. See Corollary 7.4 in Section 7.1
Theorem 6.7 (Outcome preservation). In pLTSNets, ∆ ✁sim Θ implies O(∆) ⊑H O(Θ).
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Proof. See Corollary 7.11 in Section 7.3.
Proof of Theorem 6.2: This is now a straightforward application of Compositionality
and Theorem 6.7.
Let us assume that N1 ✁sim N2. To prove the conclusion, N1 ⊑may N2, we must show
that O(N1 ‖> T ) ⊑H O(N2 ‖> T ) for an arbitrary testing network T such that both N1 ‖> T
and N2 ‖> T are defined. For such a T Compositionality entails (N1 ‖> T ) ✁sim (N2 ‖> T ),
and now we can apply Theorem 6.7.
6.2. The Must Case. In this Section we give a sound proof method for the must-testing
preorder. It has already been observed that, for standard probabilistic process calculi such
as pCSP [7], the must-testing can be characterised by looking at the set of actions which are
not enabled in processes. This is because outputs in such a calculus are blocking actions;
in order for an action to be performed, a synchronisation (either within the process or with
the external environment) must occur. This leads to the notion of failure simulations.
This is not true for broadcast systems, where the nature of the broadcast action is non-
blocking. It has been observed in [9] that, if broadcast communication is assumed, then
the must-testing relation can be used to observe only if a computation of a process cannot
proceed (that is, no internal actions nor broadcasts are possible).
Following this intuition, we readapt the notion of failure simulation given in [7].
Definition 6.8 (Deadlocked Networks, Terminal Distributions). The predicate δ : Nets→
{true, false} is defined by letting δ(M) = true whenever the following conditions are met:
(i) ω(M) = false,
(ii) M τ7−−→6 ,
(iii) M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→6 for any c, v, η.
Networks for which the predicate δ is true are called deadlock networks, or deadlocked. Note
that the term deadlock network makes sense only in the reduction semantics. Deadlock
networks are those whose computation cannot proceed autonomously; however, it could
be the case that an input from the external environment makes the network evolve in a
distribution where the computation can proceed, thus resolving the deadlock.
A distribution ∆ is said to be terminal if any network in its support is either deadlocked
or successful.
Next we present a notion of simulation which is sensitive to deadlocked networks:
Definition 6.9 (Deadlock Simulations). The relation ⊑DS⊆ Nets×Dsub(Nets) is the largest
relation such that whenever M⊑DS Θ
(i) if δ(M) = true then Θ
τ
|==⇒ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that δ(N ) = true for any N ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉,
(ii) if M
λ
|==⇒ ∆ for some ∆ ∈ Dsub(Nets) then Θ
λ
|==⇒ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that
∆ ⊑DS Θ
′.
38 A. CERONE AND M. HENNESSY
We use the notation Θ ⊒DS M forM⊑DS Θ. Note that deadlock simulations are sensitive
to divergence. That is, whenever M ⊑DS Θ and M
τ
|==⇒ ε, then Θ
τ
|==⇒ ε. To prove this,
note first that for any relation R ⊆ Nets×Dsub(Nets) then whenever ∆ R Θ we have that
|∆| ≥ |Θ|; this follows at once from Definition 2.2. Thus if M ⊑DS Θ and M
τ
|==⇒ ε, by
definition it follows that Θ
τ
|==⇒ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that ε ⊑DS Θ
′; but this means that
0 = |ε| ≥ |Θ′|, or equivalently Θ′ = ε.
Before discussing the soundness of deadlock simulations for must testing let us discuss
briefly the definition of deadlock simulations. First, note that the deadlock simulation
relation ⊑DS is lifted to a relation between sub-distributions, rather than to a relation
between (full) distributions. This is needed, since the Must-testing preorder is sensitive to
divergence.
Example 6.10 (Divergence). Let M = Γ ✄ mJ0K, N = Γ ✄ mJDivK, where Γ is the
connectivity graph containing the sole node m and no connections and Div⇐ τ.Div.
It is immediate to show that M 6⊒DS N , since the move N
τ
|==⇒ ε cannot be matched
by M.
Even more, it is straightforward to note that M 6⊑must N . Consider in fact the test
T = ΓT ✄ nJτ.ωK, where ΓT is the connectivity graph consisting of the sole node n. Note
that, since N
τ
|==⇒ ε we also have N ‖> T
τ
|==⇒ ε, and therefore 0 ∈ O(N ‖> T ). Intuitively
the last hyper-derivation can be inferred by always letting process Div perform a τ -action
in N ‖> T . On the other hand we have that O(M ‖> T ) = {1}, since the only possible
transition for M ‖> T is (M ‖> T ) τ7−−→ M ‖> (ΓT ✄ nJωK), and the latter is ω-successful.
Since 0 ∈ O(N ‖> T ), but 0 /∈ O(N ‖> T ), it follows that M 6⊑must N .
However, suppose that Definition 6.9 is changed by only considering hyper-derivations
of the formM
λ
|==⇒ ∆, where ∆ is a distribution. In this case we would have that the only
possible (weak) move for the network N above is N
τ
|==⇒ N , which can be matched by
M
τ
|==⇒ M. Therefore we would have that M ⊒DS N , and since we already proved that
M 6⊑must N Theorem 6.14 would no longer hold.
Also, deadlock simulation is defined as a relation between networks and sub-distributions
of states, rather than a relation between networks. This is in contrast with the definition of
simulation given in Section 6.1, which has been defined as a relation between networks. In
fact, since deadlock simulation also considers sub-distributions the latter approach would
have led to a less discriminating relation.
Remark 6.11. Note that, for any sub-distribution ∆ we have that ∆ ⊑DS ε; in fact, it is
straightforward to show that ε
λ
|==⇒ ε for any extensional action λ, and since ⌈ε⌉ = ∅ we
also have that δ(N ) = true for any N ∈ ⌈ε⌉.
Now suppose that deadlock simulation had been defined as a relation between networks,
by letting M⊑′DS N be the largest relation such that
(i) if δ(M) = true then N
τ
|==⇒ Θ for some Θ such that δ(L) = true for any L ∈ ⌈Θ⌉,
(ii) whenever M
λ
|==⇒ ∆ then N
λ
|==⇒ Θ with ∆ (⊑′DS)
e Θ.
While Theorem 6.14 would still hold with this definition of deadlock simulations, it is
straightforward to show that if ∆ (⊑′DS)
e Θ then |∆| = |Θ|. As a consequence, whenever
∆ (⊑′DS)
e ε it would follow that ∆ = ε.
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Therefore we have that, for any non-empty sub-distribution ∆, ∆ ⊑DS ε, but not
∆ (⊑′DS)
e ε; that is, the definition of deadlock simulation proposed above is less discrimi-
nating than the one given in Definition 6.9.
The proof of soundness of deadlock simulations follows the same structure as the cor-
responding proof for simulations in Section 6.1. It relies on the following two technical
results.
Theorem 6.12 (Outcome preservation). If ∆ ⊑DS Θ then O(∆) ⊑S O(Θ).
Proof. See Corollary 7.14 in Section 7.3.
Theorem 6.13 (Compositionality). LetM be a network and Θ be a stable sub-distribution
such that M ⊑DS Θ. Then, for any network N such that both M ‖> N and Θ ‖> N are
defined it follows that (M ‖> N ) ⊑DS (Θ ‖> N ).
Proof. See Corollary 7.8 in Section 7.2
Theorem 6.14 (Soundness for Must-testing). LetM,N be two finitary networks such that
In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ). If M⊒DS N then M⊑must N .
Proof. Suppose that M ⊒DS N , and suppose that In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ).
Note also that M is a stable distribution.
Let T be a network such that both M ‖> T and N ‖> T are defined. Composition-
ality, Corollary 7.8 gives that (M ‖> T ) ⊒DS (N ‖> T ), while Theorem 6.12 states that
O(M ‖> T ) ⊑S O(N ‖> T ). Since the testing network T has been chosen arbitrarily, it
follows that M⊑must N .
6.3. Proof Methods for Convergent Networks. One of the main drawbacks of dead-
lock simulations is that they require the use of probability sub-distributions. As we have
seen in example 6.10, using sub-distributions is necessary for ensuring the validity of Theo-
rem 6.14. We have also emphasised that this constraint is necessary since the must-testing
preorder is sensitive to divergence.
However, sub-distributions are no longer needed if we focus on convergent networks,
that this those whose generated pLTS (with respect to the strong extensional semantics)
does not contain a state M for which M
τ
|==⇒ ε holds.
Definition 6.15 (Divergence-free Deadlock Simulations). The relation ✁
ds
⊆ Nets × Nets
is defined as the largest relation such that whenever M ✁
ds
N
(i) if δ(M) = true then N
τ
|==⇒ Θ for some Θ such that δ(L) = true whenever L ∈ ⌈Θ⌉,
(ii) if M
λ
|==⇒ ∆ then N
λ
|==⇒ Θ for some Θ such that ∆ ✁
ds
e Θ.
We write N ✄
ds
M for M ✁
ds
N .
Theorem 6.16 (Soundness for Convergent Networks, Must-testing). Let M,N be two
convergent networks such that In(M) = In(N ) and Out(M) = Out(N ); if M ✄
ds
N then
M⊑must N .
Proof. It suffices to show that ✁
ds
is included in ⊑DS. To this end, note that if M
λ
|==⇒ ∆
and M is a convergent network, then |∆| = 1, by Proposition 2.8.
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Having a simpler sound proof technique is not the only advantage that we gain by
focusing on convergent networks. In fact, if we make a further restriction and we compare
networks whose codes running at nodes do not contain the success clause ω, it follows
that the relation ✁
ds
is also included in the may-testing preorder ⊑may. This restriction is
justified since in general we require the tests applied to a network, rather than the networks
to be tested, to contain the clause ω to denote the success of an experiment.
Theorem 6.17 (Soundness for Convergent Networks, May-testing). A network Γ ✄M is
proper if the term M does not contain any occurrence of the special clause ω.
LetM,N be convergent, proper networks such that In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ).
If M ✁
ds
N then M⊑may N .
Proof. It is trivial to note that the relation ✁
ds
is included in ✁
sim
when restricted to
convergent, proper networks. The result follows then from Theorem 6.2.
7. Technical development
In this section we collect the proofs of some technical results underlying our soundness
results; it may safely be skipped by the uninterested reader. The first to results concern the
compositionality of the simulation preorders. The last outlines the proofs about Outcome
preservation.
7.1. Compositionality for simulations. This section is devoted to the proof of Theo-
rem 6.6, namely that the simulation preorder is preserved by the extension operator ‖>. In
general such compositionality results depends on decomposition and (re-)composition results
for the actions used in the definition of simulations. Definition 6.1 uses weak extensional
actions, and providing decomposition results for these would be a difficult undertaking.
Instead we first give an alternative characterisation of the simulation preorder, for which
decomposition results for strong actions is sufficient. These (strong) decomposition results,
and (re)-composition results for weak actions have already been given in Section 5.2.
Definition 7.1 (Simple simulations). In pLTSNets we let ✁
s denote the largest relation in
Nets× Nets such that if M ✁s N then:
• In(M) = In(N ),Out(M) = Out(N ),
• if ω(M) = true then N
τ
|==⇒ Θ such that ω(L) = true for any L ∈ ⌈θ⌉,
• otherwise,
(i) whenever M λ7−−→ ∆ there is a Θ ∈ D(Nets) with N
λ
|==⇒ Θ and ∆ (✁s)e Θ.
Theorem 7.2 (Alternative characterisation). In pLTSNets, M ✁sim N if and only if M ✁
s
N , provided that M and N are finitary networks.
Proof. (Outline) The proof is similar in style to the one of Theorem 7.20 of [7]; however,
there are some extra complications, mainly because of the more complicated definition of
weak extensional actions. Here we report a detailed outline of the proof; we first prove that
✁
sim
is included in ✁s, then we show that, for finitary networks, the converse inclusion also
holds.
Showing that the relation ✁
sim
is included in ✁s is straightforward. We only need to
show that ✁
sim
satisfies the constraints of Definition 7.1. Suppose that M ✁
sim
N . Then
this hypothesis ensures that
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• In(M) = In(N ),Out(M) = Out(N ) and
• if ω(M) = true then N
τ
|==⇒ Θ such that ω(L) = true for any L ∈ ⌈Θ⌉.
Suppose however that ω(M) = false and M λ7−−→ ∆ for some ∆. Then we also have that
M
λ
|==⇒ ∆, from which it follows from the hypothesis M ✁
sim
N that there exists Θ such
that N
τ
|==⇒ Θ and ∆ (✁
sim
)e Θ, which is exactly what we wanted to show.
It remains to show that, for finitary networks, the relation ✁s is included in ✁
sim
.
Here the main difficulty consists in showing that, whenever M ✁s N , ω(M) = false and
M
λ
|==⇒ ∆, then N
λ
|==⇒ Θ for some Θ such that ∆ (✁s)e Θ. The proof of this statement
is performed by a case analysis on the action λ;
(1) First suppose that λ = τ . This case can be proved in the analogous way of Theorem
7.20 of [7]. Note that we require networks to be finitary in this case, since the proof
requires properties of hyper-derivations which in general are not satisfied by infinitary
plTSs; see Lemma 6.12 of [7].
(2) Now suppose that λ = i.c?v for some i, c, v; then M
i.c?v
|====⇒ ∆ implies that there exist
∆′,∆′′ such that M
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆′′
τ
|==⇒. Since M ✁s N and M
τ
|==⇒ ∆′, by
the previous case N
τ
|==⇒ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that ∆′ (✁s)e Θ′. Since ∆′ i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆′′,
we can conclude that Θ′
i.c?v
|====⇒ Θ′′ for some Θ′′ such that ∆′′ (✁s)e Θ′′. Finally,
since ∆′′
τ
|==⇒ ∆, by the previous case5 we obtain that Θ′′
τ
|==⇒ Θ for some Θ such
that ∆ (✁s)e Θ. Therefore we have shown that N
τ
|==⇒ Θ′
i.c?v
|====⇒ Θ′′
τ
|==⇒ Θ, or
equivalently N
i.c?v
|====⇒ Θ, and ∆ (✁s)e Θ, which is exactly what we needed to prove.
(3) Finally, suppose that λ = c!v ✄ η for some c, v and non-empty set of nodes η. We
perform an inner induction on the proof of the derivation M
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆;
• M
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆ because M
τ
|==⇒
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→
τ
|==⇒ ∆. This case is identical to the one
λ = i.c?v,
• M
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆ because M
c!v✄η1|======⇒ ∆′
c!v✄η2|======⇒ ∆, where η1 ∪ η2 = η, η1 ∩ η2 = ∅.
Since M ✁s N , by the (inner) inductive hypothesis we have that N
c!v✄η1|======⇒ Θ′ for
some Θ′ such that ∆′ (✁s)e Θ′. A second application of the inductive hypothesis to the
last statement gives that Θ′
c!v✄η2|======⇒ Θ for some Θ such that ∆ (✁s)e Θ. Therefore
we have shown that N
c!v✄η1|======⇒ Θ′
c!v✄η2|======⇒ Θ, or equivalently N
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ Θ (recall
that η1 ∪ η2 = η and η1 ∩ η2 = ∅), and ∆ (✁s)e Θ, as we wanted to prove.
Theorem 7.2 enables us to exploit the results developed in Section 5.2 for proving the
compositionality of ✁
sim
with respect to the extension operator ‖>. Since such results are
valid only in the case that a network M is composed with a generating network G, we first
focus on compositionality with respect to a generating network.
Theorem 7.3. Suppose In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ) and both M ‖> G and N ‖> G
are defined. Then M ✁s N implies M ‖> G ✁s N ‖> G.
Proof. It suffices to show that the relation
S = {((M ‖> G), (N ‖> G) | M ✁s N )}
satisfies the requirements of Definition 7.1. We denote the network G with ΓG ✄ nJsK.
5Note that here it is necessary to decompose ∆′′ as a sum of state-based networks, each of which can
perform a weak τ -action.
42 A. CERONE AND M. HENNESSY
Suppose thatM ‖> G
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆; note that the definition of extensional output ensures
that η 6= ∅. We need to show that N ‖> G
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ Θ, and ∆ Se Θ. By Proposition 5.6
we know that ∆ = ∆M ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJΘnK), where ∆M , Θn are determined according to six
different cases, which are considered below.
(i) M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆M , n /∈ η and Θn = s; since M ✁
s N it follows that N
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ΘN
for some ΘN such that ∆M (✁s)e ΘN . Since n /∈ η, By Proposition 5.7 it follows
that N ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ΘN ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJsK). Now it suffices to note that
(∆M ‖> ΓG ✄ nJsK) (S)e (∆N ‖> ΓG ✄ nJsK), as we wanted to prove
(ii) M
c!v✄η∪{n}
7−−−−−−−−→ ∆M , n /∈ η and s
c?v
−→Θn. SinceM ✁
s N it follows thatN
c!v✄η∪{n}
|========⇒
ΘN , where ∆M (✁s)e ΘN . Since η 6= ∅, that is {n} ⊂ (η ∪ {n}), we can apply
Proposition 5.7(2)(ii) to the weak extensional transition N
c!v✄η∪{n}
|========⇒ ΘN and
the process transition s
c?v
−→ Θn to infer N ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄(η∪{n})\{n}
|============⇒ ΘN ‖>
(ΓG ✄ nJΘnK); since we are assuming that n /∈ η, the latter can be rewritten as
N ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJsK
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ΘN ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJΘnK); again, since ∆M (✁s)e ΘN , we have
that (∆M ‖> ΓG ✄ nJΘnK) Se ΘN ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJΘnK)
(iii) M
c!v✄η∪{n}
7−−−−−−−−→ ∆M , s 6
c?v
−−→ and Θn = s. This case is similar to the previous one, this
time employing Proposition 5.7(2)(iii)
(iv) M m.c?v7−−−−−→ ∆M , s
c!v
−→ Θn and η = Out((ΓG ✄ nJsK)). Since M ✁
s N we have that
N
m.c?v
|=====⇒ ΘN for some ΘN such that ∆M (✁s)e ΘN . It follows from Proposition
5.7(2)(iv) that N ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ΘN ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJΘnK). Now note that
(∆M ‖> ΓG ✄ nJΘnK) (S)e (ΘN ‖> ΓG ✄ nJΘnK)
(v) m /∈ In(M),∆ =M and s
c!v
−→Θn. Since M ✁sim N it follows that m /∈ In(N ), hence
by Proposition 5.7 we have that N ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJsK)
m.c?v
|=====⇒ N ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJΘnK). Now
the hypothesis M ✁s N ensures that M ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJΘnK)lif t(S)
eN ‖> (ΓG ✄ nJΘnK).
The cases (M ‖> G) τ7−−→ and (M ‖> G) i.c?v7−−−−→ are treated similarly, and are therefore left
as an exercise for the reader.
However, since generating networks can be used to generate all the networks in Nets,
Proposition 4.6, we can easily generalise Theorem 7.3 to arbitrary networks.
Corollary 7.4 (Compositionality: Theorem 6.6). Let M,N be finitary networks such that
In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ). Also, suppose L is a network such that both M ‖> L
and N ‖> L are defined. Then M ✁
sim
N implies (M ‖> L) ✁
sim
(N ‖> L).
Proof. First note that the only elements used to define simulations are network interfaces,
the set of outcomes of networks and the extensional transitions that networks can perform.
These definitions are preserved by the structural congruence between networks defined
on page 14. As a consequence, simulations are identified up-to structural congruence; if
M≡M′, M′ ✁
sim
N ′ and N ′ ≡ N , it follows that M ✁
sim
N .
Suppose then that M ✁
sim
N , and let L be a network such that both (M ‖> L) and
(N ‖> L) are defined. We show that (M ‖> L) ✁
sim
(N ‖> L) by induction on nodes(L).
• nodes(L) = 0. In this case we have that
(M ‖> L) ≡M ✁
sim
N ≡ (N ‖> L),
• nodes(L) > 0. By Proposition 4.6 there exist two networks L′ and G such that L ≡ (L′ ‖>
G). In particular (M ‖> L) ≡ M ‖> (L′ ‖> G) = (M ‖> L′) ‖> G, where we have used the
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associativity of the operator ‖>, Proposition 4.4. Note that nodes(L′) < nodes(L), hence
by the inductive hypothesis it follows that (M ‖> L′) ✁
sim
(N ‖> L′). By Theorem 7.2
we obtain that (M ‖> L′) ✁s (N ‖> L′), and Theorem 7.3 gives that ((M ‖> L′) ‖> G) ✁s
(N ‖> L′) ‖> G). Another application of 7.2 and the associativity of the operator ‖> lead
to (M ‖> (L′ ‖> G)) ✁
sim
N ‖> (L′ ‖> G). Therefore we have that
(M ‖> L) ≡ (M ‖> (L′ ‖> G)) ✁
sim
N ‖> (L′ ‖> G) ≡ (N ‖> L)
as we wanted to prove.
7.2. Compositionality for deadlock simulations. As we have already done in Section
7.1, here we also rely on an alternative characterisation of the ⊑DS preorder, which is more
amenable to decomposition/composition results.
Definition 7.5 (Simple Deadlock Simulation). Let ⊑sDS⊆ Nets×Dsub(Nets) be the largest
relation such that whenever M ⊑sDS Θ then In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ) for any
N ∈ ⌈Θ⌉; further
• if M |==⇒ ε then N |==⇒ ε,
• otherwise,
(i) if δ(M) = true then Θ |==⇒ Θ′ such that δ(N ) = true for any N ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉,
(ii) if M λ7−−→ ∆′, then Θ
λ
|==⇒ Θ′ and ∆′ ⊑sDS Θ
′.
Theorem 7.6 (Alternative Characterisation of Deadlock Simulations). If M is a finitary
network and Θ is a finitary sub-distribution of networks then M ⊑DS Θ if and only if
M⊑sDS Θ.
Proof. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 7.2.
Theorem 7.7 (Single Node Compositionality for Deadlock Simulations). Let M be a net-
work and Θ be a stable sub-distribution such that M⊑sDS Θ. Then, for any network G such
that M ‖> G and Θ ‖> G are well-defined it follows that (M ‖> G) ⊑DS (Θ ‖> G).
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7.3. There are, however, some extra
statements that we need to check.
• If M ‖> G
τ
|==⇒ ε then N ‖> G
τ
|==⇒ ε. This can be proved by rewriting by inspecting
the infinite sequence of τ -moves which constitute the hyper-derivation M ‖> G
τ
|==⇒ ε to
build an hyper-derivation of the form M ‖> G
τ
|==⇒ ε. This step requires employing the
composition and decomposition results developed in Section 5.2.
• For any M ∈ Nets,G ∈ G such that M ‖> G is defined, δ(M ‖> G) = true implies
δ(M) = true and δ(G) = true,
• For any stable sub-distribution ∆ and network G ∈ G, suppose that ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′, where
∆′ is such that δ(M) = true for any M∈ ⌈∆⌉′; further, suppose that G
τ
|==⇒ Θ for some
Θ such that δ(N ) = true for any N ∈ ⌈Θ⌉. Then ∆ ‖> G
τ
|==⇒ Λ, and δ(L) = true for any
N ∈ ⌈Λ⌉.
The validity of the two statements above can be easily proved using the results developed
in Section 5.2.
Corollary 7.8. [Theorem 6.13] LetM be a network and Θ be a stable sub-distribution such
that M ⊑DS Θ. Then, for any network N such that both M ‖> N and Θ ‖> N are defined
it follows that (M ‖> N ) ⊑DS (Θ ‖> N ).
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Proof. By induction on the number of nodes contained in nodes(N ), using Theorem 7.6.
The proof is analogous to that of Corollary 7.4.
7.3. Outcome preservation. The aim of this section is to prove Theorem 6.7 and The-
orem 6.12, namely that simulations preserve, in the sense of Definition 4.12, the outcomes
generated by networks. To this end, we first need two technical results.
Lemma 7.9. If M ✁
sim
N , then cl(M) ✁
sim
cl(N ).
Proof. It suffices to show that the relation
S = {(cl(M), cl(N )) | M ✁
sim
N}
satisfies the requirements of Definition 6.1. Let M,N such that M ✁
sim
N , Since the
only possibility for networks of the form cl(M), cl(N ) is that of performing τ -extensional
actions, we only have to check that if ω(cl(M)) = true then cl(N )
τ
|==⇒ Θ for some Θ such
that ω(L) = true for any L ∈ ⌈Θ⌉.
Suppose then that ω(cl(M)) = true. It follows immediately that ω(M) = true, and
since by hypothesisM ✁
sim
N , we have that N
τ
|==⇒ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that ω(L′) = true
for any L′ ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉. Therefore we have that cl(N )
τ
|==⇒ cl(Θ′). It follows that ⌈cl(Θ′)⌉ =
{cl(L′) | L′ ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉}, hence any network L ∈ ⌈cl(Θ′)⌉ satisfies the predicate ω.
Lemma 7.10. Let ∆,Θ be stable distributions in pLTSNets such that ∆ (✁sim)
e Θ; then
Θ ==✄≻ Θ′ such that V(∆) ≤ V(Θ′).
Proof. Note that in the statement of Lemma 7.10 we use the extreme derivative associated
with the reduction relation _ defined for the testing structures associated with networks.
We have seen in Section 5.3 that such extreme derivatives do not coincide with weak τ -
actions in the extensional semantics, except in the case of closed distributions.
Therefore, let us first prove the statement for closed distributions, that is those whose
networks in the support have an empty interface. Let then ∆,Θ be such that Intf(∆) =
Intf(Θ) = ∅.
We have two different cases.
(i) First suppose ∆ is a point distribution M. If the predicate ω(M) is equal to false,
V(M) = 0. In this case, we recall that Theorem 2.6 (4) ensures that there exists at
least one extreme derivation Θ ==✄≻ Θ′, for which 0 ≤ V(Θ′) trivially holds.
Otherwise the predicate ω(M) is satisfied and V(M) has to be 1. SinceM ✁
sim
Θ
we know Θ |===⇒ Θ′, such that for allN ∈ Θ′, ω(N ) = true. Also, since Θ is closed, the
hyper-derivation above can be rewritten as Θ ==✄ Θ′. This means that V(Θ′) = 1;
moreover, as every state in ⌈Θ′⌉ is a successful state, we also have that Θ ==✄≻ Θ′.
(ii) Otherwise Θ can be written as
∑
M∈⌈∆⌉∆(M) · ΘM where M(✁sim
e)ΘM for each
M in the support of ∆. By part (i) each ΘM ==✄≻ Θ
′
M such that V(M) ≤ V(Θ
′
M).
As an extreme derivative is also a hyper-derivative, we can combine these to obtain
a hyper derivation for Θ, using Theorem 2.6 (3). This leads to
Θ =
∑
M∈⌈∆⌉
∆(M) ·ΘM =⇒
∑
M∈⌈∆⌉
Θ′M = Θ
′
As for everyM ∈ ⌈∆⌉, N ∈ ⌈Θ′s⌉ we have thatN _ implies ωN = true, this condition
is respected also by all states in ⌈Θ′⌉. Thus, the hyper derivation Θ ==✄ Θ′ is also
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an extreme derivation. Finally, the quantity V(∆) =
∑
{∆(M) | ω(M) = true} can
be rewritten as
∑
M∈⌈∆⌉ V(M), leading to
V(∆) =
∑
M∈⌈∆⌉
V(M) ≤
∑
M∈⌈∆⌉
V(Θ′M) = V(Θ
′) .
For more general distributions ∆,Θ it suffices to note that if ∆ (✁
sim
)e Θ then cl(∆) (✁
sim
e)
cl(Θ). For such (closed) distributions of networks we have that cl(Θ) ==✄≻ Θ′′, and
V(cl(∆)) ≤ V(Θ′′). Now Corollary 5.12 ensures that Θ′′ = cl(Θ′) for some Θ′ such that
Θ ==✄≻ Θ′. Finally, by Corollary 5.13 we obtain that
V(∆) = V(cl(∆)) ≤ V(cl(Θ′)) = V(Θ′)
which concludes the proof.
Corollary 7.11 (Theorem 6.7). In pLTSNets, ∆ ✁sim Θ implies O(∆) ⊑H O(Θ).
Proof. We first prove the result for closed distributions ∆,Θ. Suppose ∆ ==✄≻ ∆′. We have
to find a derivation Θ ==✄≻ Θ′ such that V(∆′) ≤ V(Θ′). Since we are assuming that ∆ is
closed, then ∆ ==✄≻ ∆′ implies ∆ |==⇒≻ ∆′, Corollary 5.12, which in turn gives ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′.
We can use the definition of ✁
sim
to find a derivation Θ
τ
|==⇒ Θ′′ such that ∆′ ✁
sim
e Θ′′.
Applying the previous lemma we obtain Θ′′ |==⇒≻ Θ′ such that V(∆′) ≤ V(Θ′). By Theorem
2.6 we have that Θ |==⇒≻ Θ′, and Corollary 5.12 gives Θ ==✄≻ Θ′.
Suppose now that ∆,Θ are not closed distributions. In this case Corollary 5.13 ensures
that
O(∆) = O(cl(∆)) ⊑H O(cl(Θ)) = O(Θ)
and there is nothing left to prove.
We now repeat the above argument to show that outcomes are also preserved by dead-
lock simulations; the details are quite similar.
Lemma 7.12. Whenever M⊑DS Θ it follows that cl(M) ⊑DS cl(Θ).
Proof. If suffices to note that, for any network M, δ(M) = true if and only if δ(cl(M)) =
true. Using this fact the result can be proved as in Lemma 7.9.
The main use of Lemma 7.12 is that of showing that whenever ∆ ⊑DS Θ then the sets
of outcomes of ∆ and Θ are related in some appropriate manner.
Lemma 7.13. Suppose that ∆ ⊑DS Θ for some terminal distribution ∆. Then Θ ==✄≻ Θ
′
for some Θ′ such that V(Θ′) ≤ V(∆).
Proof. First suppose that ∆ is a closed distribution, that is for any network M ∈ ⌈∆⌉ we
have that Intf(∆) = ∅.
(1) if ∆ =M we have two possible cases:
(i) δ(M) = false; since we are assuming that M is a terminal distribution then it
has to be ωM = true, which implies V(M) = 1. In this case we are ensured that
Θ ==✄≻ Θ′ for some Θ′, and V(Θ′) ≤ 1, trivially holds.
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(ii) δ(M) = true; in this case ω(M) = false, hence V(M) = 0. Therefore we have
to show that Θ ==✄≻ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that V(Θ′) = 0. Since M ⊑DS Θ, we
have that Θ |==⇒ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that δ(N ) = true for any N ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉, which
is equivalent to V(Θ′) = 0. Further, Θ |==⇒ Θ′ implies Θ ==✄ Θ′. Since N τ7−−→6 ,
N
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→6 for any N ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉, which is equivalent to N 6_ for any N ∈ ⌈Θ′⌉, we
also have Θ ==✄≻ Θ′.
(2) otherwise, ∆ =
∑
i∈I pi · Mi, Θ =
∑
i∈I pi · Θi with
∑
i∈I pi ≤ 1 and Mi ⊑DS Θi for
any i ∈ I. This part of the Lemma can be proved as in Lemma 7.10.
Now let ∆ be a general distribution, not necessarily closed. By Lemma 7.12 it follows that
cl(∆) ⊑DS cl(Θ), therefore there exists a sub-distribution Θ
′ such that cl(Θ) ==✄≻ cl(Θ′),
and V(cl(Θ′)) ≤ V(cl(∆)). This in turn implies that Θ ==✄≻ Θ′, and
V(Θ′) = V(cl(Θ′)) ≤ V(cl(∆)) = V(∆) .
Corollary 7.14 (Theorem 6.12). If ∆ ⊑DS Θ then O(∆) ⊑S O(Θ).
Proof. First suppose that ∆ is a closed sub-distribution; let ∆′ be a sub-distribution such
that ∆ ==✄≻ ∆′; we have to show that Θ ==✄≻ Θ′ for some Θ′ such that V(Θ′) ≤ V(∆′).
Note that, since ∆ is closed, this is equivalent to ∆ |==⇒≻ ∆′. Further, it is straightforward
to note that ∆′ is terminal. Since ∆ ⊑DS Θ it follows that Θ |==⇒ Θ
′′ for some Θ′′ (which
also implies Θ ==✄ Θ′′) such that ∆′ ⊑DS Θ
′′. Since ∆′ is terminal, by Lemma 7.13 we also
have that Θ′′ ==✄≻ Θ′ and V(Θ′) ≤ V(∆′). Now we just need to combine the reductions
Θ ==✄ Θ′′ and Θ′′ ==✄≻ Θ′ to obtain Θ ==✄≻ Θ′.
If ∆ is not a closed sub-distribution, we have that cl(∆) ⊑DS cl(Θ); since cl(∆) is closed
it follows that O(∆) = O(cl(∆)) ⊑S O(cl(Θ)) = O(Θ).
8. Failure of Completeness
Although the simulation preorder ✁
sim
provides a proof methodology for establishing that
two networks are be related via the testing preorder ⊑may, it is not complete.
That is, it is possible to find two networks M,N such that M ⊑may N holds, but
M cannot be simulated by N . Similarly, for the must-testing preorder, we have that it
is possible to exhibit two networks M,N such that M ⊑must N , but M 6⊒DS N . This
results are quite surprising, as simulation preorder has been already proved to provide a
characterisation of the may-testing preorder for more standard process calculi such as pCSP,
while the must-testing preorder has been proved to be characterised by failure simulations
[7]. Here, for simplicity, we discuss the failure of completeness for the sole ⊑may preorder;
however, the examples discussed here can be used to show that the relation ⊑must is also
incomplete.
The main problem that arises in our setting is that the mathematical basis of simulation
preorders rely on (full) probability distributions, which are a suitable tool in a framework
where a weak action from a process term has to be matched with the same action performed
by a distribution of processes.
This is not true in our calculus; we have already shown that, due to the presence of local
broadcast communication, it is possible to match a weak broadcast action with a sequence of
outputs whose sets of target nodes are pairwise disjoint. This behaviour has been formalised
by giving a non-standard definition of weak extensional actions in Definition 5.3.
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Figure 15: Two testing related networks
Such a definition captures the possibility of simulating a broadcast through a multicast
only when the former action is performed with probability 1.
However, when comparing distributions of networks we have to also match actions
which are performed with probabilities less than 1, at least informally; here the simulation
of broadcast using multicast runs into problems, as the following example shows.
Example 8.1. Consider the two networks ΓM ✄M , ΓN ✄N depicted in Figure 15; let
M = mJτ.(c!〈v〉 0.9⊕ 0K
N = mJc!〈v〉K | nJc?(x) .(c!〈x〉 0.9⊕ 0)K
In ΓM ✄M a message is broadcast to nodes o1, o2 with probability 0.9, while in ΓN ✄ N
two different broadcasts happen in sequence. The first broadcast, which can be detected by
node o1, happens with probability 1. The second broadcast, detectable by node o2 happens
with probability 0.9. As a result, the overall probability of message v to be detected by
both nodes o1, o2 is again 0.9.
We first show that ΓM ✄M ⊑may ΓN ✄N , then we prove that ΓM ✄M 6✁sim ΓN ✄N .
For the first statement, we only supply informal details, as a complete proof would be rather
long and technical. Consider a test ΓT ✄ T , such that both (ΓM ✄M) ‖> (ΓT ✄ T ) and
ΓN ✄ N ‖> (ΓT ✄ T ) are defined. Without loss of generality, suppose that both o1, o2 ∈
nodes(ΓT ✄ T ), that is T ≡ o1Jt1K | o2Jt2K | T
′. We consider only the most interesting
case, that is when the testing component reaches (with some probability p) an ω-successful
configuration after network ΓM ✄M broadcasts the message v. In this case, a computation
fragment of (ΓM ✄M) ‖> (ΓT ✄ T ) can be summarised as follows:
(1) The testing component ΓT ✄ T performs some internal activity, thus leading to ΓT ✄
T
τ
|==⇒ ΓT ✄ o1JΛ1K | o2JΛ2K | ΛT ,
(2) At this point, the network ΓM ✄M performs a τ -extensional action, specifically ΓM ✄
M τ7−−→ ΓM ✄∆, where
∆ = 0.9 ·M1 + 0.1 ·M2
M1 = mJc!〈v〉K
M2 = mJ0K
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(3) The distribution ΓT ✄ o1JΛ1K | o2JΛ2K |ΛT performs some other internal activity, that is
ΓT ✄ o1JΛ1K | o2JΛ2K | ΛT
τ
|==⇒ ΓT ✄ o1JΛ
′
1K | o2JΛ
′
2K | Λ
′
T
(4) At this point, the distribution ΓM ✄∆ broadcasts the message v with probability 0.9,
causing the testing component to evolve in ΓT ✄ o1JΛ
′′
1K | o2JΛ
′′
2K | Λ
′
T ; note that only
nodes o1 and o2 are affected by the broadcast performed by node m. After performing
the broadcast, the tested network becomes deadlocked.
Consider now the network (ΓN✄N) ‖> ΓT✄T . For such a network, a matching computation
will proceed as follows:
(1) The testing component ΓT ✄ T performs the two sequences of internal activities as
before, ending up in the distribution ΓT ✄ o1JΛ
′
1K | o2JΛ
′
2K | Λ
′
T .
(2) At this point, the network ΓN ✄N performs a broadcast, ΓN ✄N
τ7−−→ ΓN ✄Θ, where
Θ = 0.9 ·N1 + ·N2
N1 = mJ0K | nJc!〈v〉K
N2 = mJ0K | nJ0K
Here note that, since the broadcast of message v fired by the network ΓM ✄M can be
detected by the sole node o1, only the code running at this node is affected in the test.
Further, the resulting distribution at this node is again Λ′′1; the test component after the
broadcast of message v to node o1 is then in the distribution ΓT ✄ o1JΛ
′′
1K | o2JΛ
′
2K |Λ
′
T .
(3) Before allowing the testing component to perform any activity, we require the distri-
bution ΓN ✄ Θ to perform the second broadcast, which will be heard by node o2; this
happens with probability 0.9. Further, such a broadcasts affects the probability dis-
tribution of processes running at the sole node o2. Thus, after the second message
has been broadcast by the tested network, the testing component will have the form
ΓT ✄ o1JΛ
′′
1K | o2JΛ
′′
2K | Λ
′
T . This is exactly the same configuration obtained in the first
experiment, after ΓM✄M has broadcast the message to both nodes o1, o2. Further, note
that the overall probability ΓN ✄N delivering the message to both the external nodes
is again 0.9. Finally, after the broadcast has been fired, the tested network reaches a
deadlocked configuration.
We have shown that, whenever the broadcast of message v by ΓM ✄M affects the testing
network ΓT ✄ T in some way, then ΓN ✄N is able to multicast the message to both o1 and
o2, causing ΓT✄T to behave in the same way. Note also that In(ΓM✄M) = In(ΓN✄N) = ∅,
so that the behaviour of the testing component ΓT ✄ T does not affect that of the tested
networks. Now the reader should be convinced that ΓM ✄M ⊑may ΓN ✄N .
Next we show that it is the case that ΓM ✄ M cannot be simulated by ΓN ✄ N .
The proof is obtained by contradiction. Suppose that ΓM ✄ M ✁sim ΓN ✄ N . Since
ΓM ✄M
τ7−−→ ΓM ✄∆, we have that ΓN ✄N
τ
|==⇒ ΓN ✄ Θ
′ for some distribution Θ′ such
that ∆ ✁
sim
e Θ′. It is straightforward to note that whenever ΓN ✄ N
τ
|==⇒ ΓN ✄ Θ
′ then
Θ′ = N .
Recall that ∆ = 0.9 ·M1 + 0.1 ·M2. Since ΓM ✄∆ ✁sim
e ΓN ✄ N , the decomposition
property of lifted relations, Definition 2.2 ensures that we can rewrite N as 0.9 ·N +0.1 ·N ,
and ΓM ✄M1 ✁sim ΓN ✄N ,
Let us focus on the network ΓM ✄M1. This network is equipped with the extensional
transition ΓM ✄M
c!v✄{o1,o2}
7−−−−−−−−−→ ΓM ✄mJc!〈v〉K. Since ΓM ✄M1 ✁sim ΓN ✄ N , it follows
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that ΓN ✄ N
c!v✄{o1,o2}|=========⇒ ΓN ✄ Θ
′′ for some distribution Θ′′. We show that this is not
possible.
This is because the only action that can be performed by ΓN ✄N is ΓN ✄N
c!v✄{o1}
7−−−−−−−→
ΓN ✄Θ; in order for ΓN ✄N to be able to perform the weak action
c!v✄{o1,o2}|=========⇒ we require
the distribution ΓN ✄Θ to perform a weak broadcast to node o2. However, this is possible
if every network in ⌈ΓN ✄Θ⌉ can perform such an action; this is not true, since N2 ∈ ⌈Θ⌉,
and the network ΓN ✄N2 is deadlocked.
We have shown that ΓM✄M1 6✁sim ΓN✄N , which in turn gives ΓM✄∆ ✁sim
e6 ΓM✄N .
Since ΓM✄M
τ7−−→ ΓM✄∆, and ΓN✄N is the only hyper-derivative of ΓN✄N , we conclude
that ΓM ✄M 6✁sim ΓN ✄N .
Note that the example above can be readapted to show that deadlock simulations are
incomplete with respect to the must-testing relations. In fact, for the networks ΓM ✄M ,
ΓN✄N of Example 8.1 it is easy to show that (ΓN✄N) ⊑must (ΓM✄M), but (ΓN✄N) 6⊒DS
(ΓM ✄M).
Example 8.1 has more serious consequences than just showing that simulation preorder
is not complete with respect to the may testing preorder. One could in fact expect that the
notion of simulation can be modified, leading to a less discriminating preorder for networks
which characterises the ⊑may preorder. We show that this is not the case.
Definition 8.2 (τ -Simulations). A relation R ⊆ Nets×D(Nets) is a τ -simulation if when-
ever MRN then In(M) = In(N ), Out(M) = Out(N ) and whenever M τ7−−→ ∆ it follows
that N
τ
|==⇒ Θ for some Θ such that ∆ R Θ.
Note that the definition of τ -simulations is very general, since the only constraints that
we have placed on them, apart from the standard checks on the input and output nodes in
the interface of networks, is that a strong τ -action has to be matched with a weak one. It
follows at once that ✁
sim
is a τ -simulation.
Theorem 8.3. There exists no τ -simulation R ⊆ Nets×D(Nets) such that M⊑may N iff
MRN .
Proof. The proof is carried out by contradiction. Suppose R ⊆ Nets × D(Nets) is a τ -
simulation such that MRN if and only if M ⊑may N , and consider the networks ΓM ✄
M,ΓN ✄ N from Example 8.1. We have already proved that ΓM ✄M ⊑may ΓN ✄ N and
so by the hypothesis we have ΓM ✄MRΓN ✄N . Note that ΓM ✄M
τ7−−→ ΓM ✄∆, where
∆ = 0.9 ·M1 + 0.1 ·M2, where M1,M2 have been already defined in Example 8.1.
Since R is a τ -simulation, the τ -action performed by ΓM ✄ M has to be matched
by a hyper-derivation in ΓN ✄ N ; we have already noted that the only possible hyper-
derivation for such a network is given by ΓN ✄ N
τ
|==⇒ ΓN ✄N . Therefore we have that
ΓM ✄∆ R ΓN ✄N . The decomposition property of lifted relations, Definition 2.2 ensures
that we can rewrite ΓN ✄N as 0.9·Θ1+0.1·Θ2, and ΓM✄MiRΓN✄Θi, i = 1, 2. It is trivial
to note that here the only possibility is that Θ1 = Θ2 = N . Therefore ΓM ✄M1RΓN ✄N ,
and by hypothesis this implies that ΓM ✄M1 ⊑may ΓN ✄N .
However, this is not possible. We show that there is a test that distinguishes the network
ΓM✄M1 from ΓN✄N . Consider the test ΓT✄T , where ΓT is the connectivity graph consist-
ing of the sole node o2 with no connections, while T = o2Jc?(x) .ωK. It is straightforward to
note that 1 ∈ O((ΓM ✄M1) ‖> (ΓT ✄ T )). However, for any p ∈ O((ΓN ✄N) ‖> (ΓT ✄ T ))
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we have p ≤ 0.9. If follows that O((ΓM ✄M1) ‖> (ΓT ✄ T )) 6⊑H O((ΓN ✄N) ‖> (ΓT ✄ T )).
That is, ΓM ✄M1 6⊑may ΓN ✄N . Contradiction.
9. Case Study: Probabilistic Routing
While our proof methods for relating probabilistic networks via the testing preorders are not
complete, they are still useful for comparing practical examples of wireless networks. Even
more, they can be used to perform a model-based verification of network protocols, showing
that their behaviour is consistent with respect to some formal specification. In this section
we show how this can be done by proving the correct behaviour of a simple probabilistic
routing protocol. For the sake of simplicity, we focus on an abstract implementation of a
geographic routing protocol, in which much of the details are left unspecified. However, it
is worth mentioning that the proposed implementation can be refined, leading to a concrete
representation of the SAMPLE probabilistic routing protocol [6].
By formal specification we mean a network M, while by network protocol we mean a
set of networks N whose elements share the same input and output nodes. Proving that the
behaviour of a protocol N is sound with respect to a formal verification M consists then in
showing that for any network N ∈ N it has to be M≃ N .
Let us now turn our attention on how this task can be achieved for a probabilistic
(connection-less) routing protocol. At least intuitively, the routing policy states that mes-
sages broadcast by a location in a network, called source, are eventually delivered to a
desired node, called destination. For the sake of simplicity, here we consider a situation in
which the source and the destination of a routing policy are two fixed external nodes, i and
o respectively.
Designing a specification for the routing policy is easy; however, there are some details
that need to be taken into account. First, we need to introduce some mathematical tools
that will enable us to equip a node in a network with some sort internal memory; this is
necessary, since in a routing protocol nodes have to store the values they have received and
which they have not yet forwarded to another node.
This can be done by relying on multisets. Roughly speaking, a multiset A is a set which
can contain more than one copy of the same element. Formally, a multiset A from a set
universe U is a function A : U → N which assigns to each element u ∈ U the number of copies
of u contained in A. For our purpose the universe U consists of the set of (closed) message
values, and we only deal with finite multisets, that is those for which
(∑
v∈U A(v)
)
<∞.
We denote with ∅ the empty multiset, that is the multiset such that ∅(v) = 0 for any
value v, and we say that A ⊆ B if A(v) ≤ B(v) for any value v. We say that v ∈ A
if A(v) > 0. Given a finite collection of multisets A1, · · · ,An, the multiset (
⋃n
i=1 Ai) is
defined by letting (
⋃n
i=1 Ai)(v) =
∑n
i=1 Ai(v).
Finally, for any multiset A and a value v, we denote with A+ v the multiset such that
(A+ v)(v) = A(v) + 1 and (A+ v)(w) = A(w) for any w 6= v. Similarly, the multiset A− v
is defined by letting (A − v)(v) = A(v) − 1 if A(v) > 0, (A − v)(v) = 0 if A(v) = 0 and
(A− v)(w) = A(w) for any w 6= v.
The second problem we need to tackle is that of ensuring that the specification we define
for the routing policy is a finitary network. This is necessary because our proof techniques
are valid only for such networks. As we will see, this can be accomplished by considering
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Figure 16: The specification ΓM ✄M for the routing policy.
a more restricted routing policy, in which only a finite amount of messages will be routed
from the source to the destination.
Let k ≥ 0; the specification we propose for the connection-less routing policy of k values
is given by the network M = ΓM ✄M
k
∅ , where ΓM is the connectivity graph depicted in
Figure 16 and Mk
A
is a system term (parametrised by a multiset A and an integer k ≥ 0)
defined as
MkA = mJP
k
AK
P 0A ⇐
∑
v∈A
c!〈v〉 .P 0A−v
P k+1
A
⇐
(∑
v∈A
c!〈v〉 .P k+1
A−v
)
+
(
c?(x) .P kA+x
)
Let us discuss the intuitive behaviour of a network of the form Mk
A
; at any given point,
the internal node m can either receive a message from node i, provided that there are still
messages to be routed, or it can forward one of the messages in the multiset A to the output
node o, if any. Note that we require the use of multisets since any value v can be broadcast
more than once by the input node i.
Formally, the behaviour of a network Mk
A
can be described as follows.
Proposition 9.1. For any k ≥ 0 and finite multiset A
(1) Mk
A
is convergent and finitary,
(2) δ(Mk
A
) = true if and only if A = ∅,
(3) if k > 0 then v Mk
A
i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆ if and only if ∆ =Mk−1
A+v,
(4) if k = 0 then Mk
A
i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆ if and only if ∆ =Mk
A
,
(5) Mk
A
c!v✄{o}
7−−−−−−→ ∆ if and only if v ∈ A and ∆ =Mk
A−v.
Let us now define a protocol which is consistent with the specification Mk∅ . As we
already mentioned, a protocol is a collection of networks. We consider only the set of
networks of the form N k
A
= ΓN ✄N
k
A
which satisfy the following conditions.
(1) In(N k
A
) = {i},Out(N k
A
) = {o},
(2) nodes(N k
A
) = {n1, n2, · · · , nj} for some j ≥ 2,
(3) ΓN ⊢ i→ m if and only if m = n1,
(4) ΓN ⊢ m→ o if and only if m = n2,
(5) ΓN ⊢ nh 6→ n1 for any h = 1, · · · , j,
(6) for any node h = 1, · · · , j there exists a path from nh to n2 in ΓN ,
(7) for any node nh, there exists a probability distribution Λh ∈ D({1, · · · , j}) such that
⌈Λh⌉ = {h
′ | ΓN ⊢ nh → nh′},
(8) we assume a set of distinct channels c1, · · · , cj such that ch 6= c for any h = 1, · · · , j,
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Figure 17: The connectivity graph of the networks in the protocol N.
(9) The system term Nk
A
is in the support of a distribution ∆k
A
, defined as
∆kA = P(n1JQ
k
A1
K | n2JRA2K |
j∏
h=3
nhJS
h
Ah
K)
where
(⋃j
h=1Ah
)
= A and
Q0A ⇐
j⊕
h=1
Λ1(j) ·
(∑
v∈A
ch!〈v〉 .Q
0
A−v
)
Qk+1
A
⇐
j⊕
h=1
Λ1(h) ·
[
c?(x) .QkA+x +
(∑
v∈A
ch!〈v〉 .Q
k+1
A−v
)]
RA ⇐ c2?(x) .RA+x +
(∑
v∈A
c!〈v〉 .RA−v
)
ShA ⇐
j⊕
h′=1
Λh(h
′) ·
[
ch?(x) .S
h
A+x +
(∑
v∈A
ch′ !〈v〉 .S
h
A−v
)]
Here we use
⊕
i=1n pi · si to denote the process such that
P(
n⊕
i=1
pi · si) =
∑
i=1n
pi · si
We denote with Nk
A
the set of networks N k
A
described above. The connectivity graph of
such networks is depicted in Figure 17
Remark 9.2. Note that we committed an abuse of notation in defining the distribution
∆k
A
, by associating a process definition with a (probabilistic) process, rather than to a state.
However, a process definition of the form A⇐
⊕n
i=1 pi · si can be seen as the probabilistic
process
⊕n
i=1 pi ·Ai, where Ai ⇐ s
′
i and s
′
i is obtained from si by replacing each occurrence
of A with
⊕n
i=1 pi ·Ai.
Our aim is to show that for any N ∈ Nk∅ we have that M
k
∅ ≃ N .
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Before supplying the details of the proof of the statement above, let us describe infor-
mally the behaviour of a distribution ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
); we also discuss the requirements that we
have placed on the structure of the connectivity graph ΓN . In a distribution ∆ ∈ D(N
k
A
) a
network is waiting to receive exactly k messages from node i, and whose multiset of received
messages which have been received but have not yet been forwarded to the external node
o is A. Note that we have placed many requirements in the definition of the connectivity
graph of such networks; first we require that i is their only input node, while o is their only
output node. This requirement is necessary, since to show that such networks are testing
equivalent to the specification we have to ensure that they share with the latter the same
sets of input and output nodes.
We require the connectivity graph of the networks in ∆ to have a path from nh to n2
for every h = 1, · · · , j. This condition is needed to ensure that messages detected by node
n1 (which in turn have been broadcast by i) can flow through the network until reaching
node n2, which in turn can broadcast the message to the output node o. As we will see this
always happens with probability 1.
The other constraints that we placed on the connectivity graph of N ∈ ⌈∆⌉ are purely
technical; we require that the only node connected to i is n1, while the only node connected
to o is n2. As we will see when discussing the code running at N
k
A
, nodes n1 and n2 have the
role of handling the values broadcast by i, and which have to be forwarded to o, respectively.
We also require that ΓN ⊢ nh 6→ n1 for any h = 1, · · · , j. This constraint ensures that all
the messages received by n1 have been broadcast by the input node i; note in fact that, in
general, a node cannot detect the name of the node that fired a broadcast.
Let us now turn our attention to the code defined for the distribution ∆k
A
. Here we
assume a set of channels c1, · · · , cj ; each node nh, h 6= 1 can only detect messages broadcast
along the channel ch. Intuitively, when a message is broadcast along channel ch by a node
nh′ , then it will be delivered to node nh. In other words, node nh′ has selected nh as the
next hop in a routing path.
We also assume a set of probability distributions Λ1, · · · ,Λj . When a node nh, h 6= 2
wishes to select the next hop in a routing path, it selects it according to the probability
distribution Λh. Note that we require that h
′ ∈ ⌈Λh⌉ if and only if N
k
A
⊢ nh → nh′ , that is a
node can be selected as the next hop in a routing path by nh if and only if it is in the range
of transmission of nh. Further, any neighbour of nh can be selected as the next hop in a
routing path. As we will see, this constraint ensures that, in unbounded time, a message
stored in node nh will reach the node n2 with probability 1.
Any network distribution ∆ ∈ D(Nk∅) can be seen as a probability distribution of
networks running a (connection-less) routing algorithm of k messages. Such an algorithm is
designed by letting any node nh, with the exception of n2, to select the next hop in a routing
path probabilistically among its neighbours. For node n2, the message is broadcast along
channel c with probability 1, thus forwarding it to the only output node o. Also, the message
to be forwarded to a next-hop in a routing path by node nh is selected non-deterministically
among those stored in such a node, that is the nodes in the multiset Ah.
Roughly speaking, the behaviour of a network ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
) can be described as follows:
(1) node n1 can receive a message v broadcast by node i along channel c, provided k ≥ 0.
Then it stores it in the multiset associated to it,
(2) At any given point, any node nh, h 6= 2 can select the next hop in a routing path among
its neighbours. Then it selects the message to be forwarded non-deterministically among
those stored in its internal multiset
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(3) At any given point, node n2 can broadcast one of the messages stored in its multiset
along channel c. This broadcast is detected by the output node o.
The behaviour of a network N ∈ Nk∅ is similar, with the only exception that the first time
each node receives a message, the next-hop of a routing path it chooses is fixed.
Let us now turn our attention to the extensional transitions performed by a network
N ∈ Nk
A
, and more generally by a distribution ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
). To this end it is useful to
introduce some notation. First we define the (state based) processes
q0,h
A
=
∑
v∈A
ch!〈v〉 .Q
0
A−v
qk+1,h
A
= c?(x) .QkA+x +
(∑
v∈A
cj!〈v〉 .Q
k+1
A−v
)
sh,h
′
A
= ch?(x) .S
h
A+x +
(∑
v∈A
ch′ !〈v〉 .S
h
A−v
)
and we note that any network N ∈ Nk
A
has the form
N = ΓN ✄ |Jq
k,h
A1
K|JRA2K
j∏
h=3
nhJs
h,h′
Ah
K
where (
⋃j
h=1 Ah) = A. For such networks, we define ValuesN (h) = Ah. Intuitively, this
function returns the multiset of values stored at node nh in the network N .
Finally, let (N k
A
)x be the unique network such that Values(N k
A
)x(2) = A. This is the
network where all the nodes that have to be routed are stored in the node n2; therefore
they are ready to be forwarded to the destination o.
We are now ready to characterise the set of strong extensional transitions performed
by any network N ∈ Nk
A
.
Proposition 9.3. For any network N ∈ Nk
A
,
(1) (i) N τ7−−→6 iff N = (N k
A
)x,
(ii) otherwise N τ7−−→ ∆ for some ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
),
(2) conversely, whenever N τ7−−→ ∆ then ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
),
(3) if k > 0 then
(i) N i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆ for some ∆ ∈ D(Nk−1
A+v),
(ii) conversely, whenever N i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆ then ∆ ∈ D(Nk−1
A+v),
(4) if k = 0 then N i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆ iff ∆ = N ,
(5) for any v ∈ ValuesN (2) then N
c!v✄{o}
7−−−−−−→ ∆ for some ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A−v),
(6) conversely, whenever N
c!v✄{o}
7−−−−−−→ ∆ then v ∈ ValuesN (2) and ∆ ∈ D(N
k
A−v).
However, in order to show that the specification Mk∅ is testing equivalent to any net-
work in Nk∅ we have to characterise also the set of weak extensional actions performed by
such networks. To this end, we first analyse the structure of any τ -extensional transition
performed by any distribution ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
).
Proposition 9.4. Let k ≥ 0, A be a finite multiset and suppose ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
).
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(1) ∆
τ
|==⇒ (N k
A
)x,
(2) whenever ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′, then ∆′
τ
|==⇒ (N k
A
)x.
Outline of the Proof. First note that, for any ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
) Proposition 9.3 ensures that
∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ implies ∆′ ∈ Dsub(N
k
A
).
Let us focus on the proof of the first statement. Let ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
) for some k ≥ 0 and finite
multiset A. We actually prove a stronger statement than (1), that is that ∆ |==⇒≻ (N k
A
)x.
First note that Theorem 2.6 (4) ensures that there exists a sub-distribution Θ such that
∆ |==⇒≻ Θ. Such a distribution Θ has to be an element of the set Dsub(N
k
A
); further,
any state in its support should not be able to perform an extensional τ -action. It follows
from Proposition 9.3 that the only possibility is that ⌈Θ⌉ ⊇ {(N k
A
)x}, or equivalently that
Θ = p · (N k
A
)x for some 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. It remains to prove that p = 1.
This follows because the probability distribution used by any node nh, h 6= 2, to select
the next-hop in a routing path is defined so that any neighbour of nh can be chosen with
probability strictly greater than 0; in particular, since we are assuming that there exists a
path from node nh to node n2, a node nh′ whose distance to n2 is less than the distance
between nh and n2 can be selected with non-negligible probability. As a consequence, in
the long run the average distance between the node where a message v ∈ A is stored and
the node n2 decreases to 0; that is, with probability 1 message v is stored in the node n2.
Since this line of reasoning is independent from the value v, we also have that in the long
run any message in A will be stored in n2 with probability 1; formally, Θ = 1 · (N kA)
x.
Now statement (2) follows trivially. Whenever ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ we have that ∆′ ∈ D(Nk
A
),
and by (1) above it follows that ∆′ |==⇒≻ N k
A
.
Corollary 9.5. Any ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
) is convergent.
Proof. Suppose ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ for some ∆′; then ∆′
τ
|==⇒ (N k
A
)
x
; it follows that |∆′| ≥ 1, hence
|∆′| = 1. As a consequence, for no network N ∈ ⌈∆⌉ we have N |==⇒ ε.
The last step that we need to take is that of characterising the set of (weak) input
and output transitions for any distribution ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
). This can be done by using both
propositions 9.3 and 9.4.
Proposition 9.6. Let k ≥ 0 and A be a multiset. Then for any distribution ∆ ∈ D(Nk
A
),
(i) ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ with δ(N ) = true for any N ∈ ⌈∆′⌉ if and only if A = ∅,
(ii) if k > 0 then
(i) ∆
i.c?v
|====⇒ ∆′ for some ∆′ for some ∆′ ∈ D(Nk−1
A+v),
(ii) conversely, whenever ∆
i.c?v
|====⇒ ∆′ then ∆′D(Nk−1
A+v),
(iii) if k = 0 then
(i) ∆
i.c?v
|====⇒ ∆′ for some ∆′ ∈ D(N0
A
),
(ii) whenever ∆
i.c?v
|====⇒ ∆′ then ∆′ ∈ D(N0
A
),
(iv) if A 6= ∅,
(a) ∆
c!v✄{o}
|======⇒ ∆′ for some ∆′ ∈ D(Nk
A−v),
(b) conversely, whenever ∆
c!v✄{o}
|======⇒ ∆′ it follows that ∆′ ∈ D(Nk
A−v).
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We are now ready to show that the protocol Nk
A
satisfies the specification Mk
A
.
Theorem 9.7. For any k ≥ 0 and N ∈ Nk∅ we have that M
k
∅ ≃ N
k
∅ .
Proof. Let k ≥ 0 and A be a finite multiset. We have already noted that the network Mk
A
is finitary. Further, it is easy to show that any network N ∈ Nk
A
is finite state, and by
Corollary 9.5 it follows that it is also finitary.
Therefore, it suffices to show that for any N ∈ Nk∅ we have both M
k
∅ ✁ds N and
N ✁
ds
Mk∅ . Theorem 6.16 gives that M
k
∅ =must N , while Theorem 6.17 ensures that
Mk∅ =may N .
In fact we prove a stronger statement. For any k ≥ 0, finite multiset A and network
N ∈ Nk
A
we have that Mk
A
✁
ds
N , and conversely N ✁
ds
N k
A
. Theorem 9.7 follows by
letting A = ∅.
To this end, consider the relation
S = {(MkA,N
′) | N ∈ NkA}
We show that this relation satisfies the requirements of Definition 6.15. First suppose that
δ(Mk
A
) = true. Then A = ∅ by Proposition 9.1, and Proposition 9.6 ensures that N k∅
τ
|==⇒ Θ
for some Θ such that for any N ′ ∈ ⌈Θ⌉ we have that δ(N ′) = true.
Now, suppose that Mk
A
i.c?v7−−−−→ ∆. By Proposition 9.1 we have two possible cases:
(1) k = 0; in this case ∆ = Mk
A
; by Proposition 9.6 we have that N
i.c?v
|====⇒ Θ for some
Θ ∈ D(Nk
A
), and trivially Mk
A
Se Θ.
(2) k ≥ 0; here ∆ =Mk−1
A
. The actionMk
A
i.c?v7−−−−→Mk−1
A+v can be matched byN
i.c?v
|====⇒ Θ,
where Θ ∈ D(Nk−1
A+v), again using Proposition 9.6.
The last case we need to check is M
c!v✄{o}
7−−−−−−→ ∆. This case is handled in the same way of
the previous ones, again using Propositions 9.1 and 9.6.
For the opposite implication, N ✁
ds
Mk, it is sufficient to consider the converse relation
S−1, showing that it satisfies the requirements of Definition 6.15. The proof is similar to the
one above, this time by using Proposition 9.3 to infer the structure of an extensional action
of the form N λ7−−→ Θ, and by matching it with an action performed by Mk
A
according to
Proposition 9.1. Here it is important to note that every action of the form Mk
A
λ7−−→ ∆ is
also a weak action, that is Mk
A
λ
|==⇒ ∆, and that a strong τ -extensional action of the form
N τ7−−→ Θ can be matched by the weak action Mk
A
τ
|==⇒Mk
A
.
10. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a calculus for wireless systems, which enjoys both proba-
bilistic behaviour and local broadcast communication. We have developed a theory based
on the probabilistic testing preorders, and provided sound proof methods for finitary net-
works to prove that they can be related via our behavioural preorders. We have applied our
proof techniques to check that a probabilistic routing protocol is consistent with a given
specification.
While testing theories have been analysed for process algebras [9] with broadcast com-
munication over a flat topology, we believe that this is the first work that considers testing
theories for a calculus which enjoys local broadcast communication.
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In the past the development of formal tools for wireless networks has focused either on
other forms of behavioural theories (such as variants of weak bisimulation) and the analysis
of protocols. Here we give a brief review of the main works which have inspired our calculus.
To the best of our knowledge, the first paper describing a process calculus for broad-
casting systems, CBS, is [28]. In this paper the author presents a simple process calculus
in which a synchronisation between a sender and a receiver is modelled as an output ac-
tion, rather than an internal activity as in standard process calculi such as CCS. This
allows multiple receivers to detect a message sent by a sender, thus implementing broad-
cast communication. In [17] different notions of barbed congruence for a variant of CBS
are introduced; these correspond to strong barbed congruence and weak barbed congru-
ence. For each of them, a characterisation result in terms of strong and weak bisimulation,
respectively, is proved.
Another calculus to model broadcast systems, known as the bpi-calculus and inspired by
both CBS and the pi-calculus [31], is introduced in [8]; as the author points out, broadcast
communication is modelled in the same style of CBS. In this paper the authors define three
different behavioural equivalences, corresponding to barbed congruence, step equivalence
and labelled bisimilarity. The author proves that such behavioural equivalences coincide.
In [9] the authors define both the may and must testing preorders for processes of the bpi-
calculus, and they prove a characterisation result for each of them. The main contribution
here lies in the characterisation of the must-testing preorder; as the authors point out, in
fact, broadcast communication leads to a non-standard characterisation of the latter. In
particular, the non-blocking nature of broadcast actions does not allow acceptance sets to
be used in their characterisation result.
In the last decade, broadcast calculi have been modified in several ways by equipping
processes with a topological structure, thus modelling wireless networks; the idea is that
of representing a process as a set of locations, running different code for broadcasting and
receiving messages; the topology defined for a process establishes how communication is
modelled, for example by letting only some locations being able to detect the messages
broadcast at another one.
In [26] the authors propose to model the topological structure of a network by using
a connectivity graph; a process is viewed as a set of locations running code, while a graph
whose vertices are locations is used to determine how communication is carried out. Intu-
itively, a transmission originated at a given location can only be detected by those vertices
which are connected to the former. The transition relation of processes is defined as para-
metric in a connectivity graph. This framework has been proposed by the authors as a basis
for the analysis of security protocols in wireless networks.
In [25] an allocation environment is used to represent the topological structure of a
wireless networks. A wireless network is intended as a parallel composition of processes,
each of which is associated with a set of locations to which the process belongs and a
probability distribution over locations; intuitively, the latter describes the probability with
which a message broadcast by the process is detected at a given location.
In [12] the authors propose a restricted broadcast process theory to model wireless net-
works. Here a network consists of a parallel composition of different processes; each process
is associated with a location name, and a function between locations to sets of locations is
used to represent the network topology. The authors propose the standard notion of weak
bisimulation as the behavioural equivalence to be used to relate networks and they show a
case study in which they prove the correctness of a routing protocol.
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In [13] an extension of the restricted broadcast process theory, the Computed Network
Theory, is proposed; here the expressive power of a network is augmented through different
operators. For the resulting calculus, a variant of strong bisimulation is defined and proved
to be a congruence. The main result in the paper is a sound axiomatisation of the strong
bisimulation, thus enabling equational reasoning for wireless networks. The authors also
show that the proposed axiomatisation is complete in a setting where only non-recursive
networks are considered. The Computed Network Theory framework is also used in [14] to
check properties of mobile networks; the authors show how both the equational theory and
model checking can be used to verify the correctness of a routing protocol.
In [32] the authors view a network as a collection of processes, each of which is associated
with one or more groups. Processes which belong to the same group are assumed to be
neighbours; as a consequence, a broadcast performed by a process can be detected by all the
processes which belong to at least one group of the broadcaster. The authors show that in
their framework state reachability is a decidable problem; further, they introduce different
notions of behavioural equivalences, based on late bisimilarity and its weak variant, and they
show that such equivalences are in fact congruences. Finally, they apply their calculus by
formalising and analysing the behaviour of a leader election protocol and a routing protocol.
In [21] the authors describe wireless networks by using metric spaces; they assume that
a network consists of a set of processes, each of which has an associated location and a
radius of transmission; a metric distance over the set of locations is assumed to determine
how communication is modelled. The authors describe the behaviour of a wireless network
in terms of both a reduction semantics and a labelled transition semantics. These two
semantics are proved to be equivalent up-to a notion of structural congruence. We remark
that in their paper the authors assume that a communication between two stations consists
of two phases, one for the beginning and one for termination. This allows the authors to
model collision-prone communication.
In [36] the authors present an extension of the calculus described above, in which
node mobility and timed communication are introduced. The authors give both a reduction
semantics and a labelled transition semantics, and they prove that they are congruent up-to
structural congruence.
Another calculus for wireless networks in which collision-prone behaviour is taken into
account is described in [23]. In their work, the authors describe a network as a set of pro-
cesses running in parallel, each of which has a location name and a semantic tag associated
with it; the latter consists of a set of locations names and it corresponds to the set of loca-
tions which can detect messages broadcast by the process. The calculus includes a notion of
discrete-time, in the style of [19], and broadcasts of messages start and end at different time
slots. The authors develop a notion of barbed congruence for wireless systems and they
propose a sound, but not complete, characterisation result in terms of weak bisimulation.
A variant of this calculus which considers only networks with flat topology is presented
in [5]. Here the authors develop a notion of reduction barbed congruence for their calculus;
they also introduce an extensional semantics whose induced weak bisimulation principle is
proved to be sound and complete with respect to the barbed congruence.
In [34] the authors propose a model in which the topological structure of a network is
represented as a graph whose vertices are locations; further, they assign to each edge in
the graph a (possibly unknown) probability as a likelihood estimate of whether a message
broadcast by a location at the starting end-point of an edge will be delivered to the location
at the terminal end-point of the same. The proposed model also allows the network topology
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of a system to evolve according to a probabilistic mobility function. The authors prove that,
in the proposed calculus, the logical equivalence defined over a variant of PCTL coincides
with weak bisimulation.
In [33] several models for modelling probabilistic ad hoc networks are developed; the
author first defines a probabilistic process calculus where connections between nodes are
probabilistic. Behavioural theories based on bisimulation and temporal logics are defined
for analysing the properties of networks in such a calculus. The presented calculus is then
extended in order to model different features of wireless networks, such as exponential time
delays and changes in the network topology.
In [22] the authors define a language for wireless networks in which the code running
at network locations contains both non-probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviour. The
topological structure of a network is defined in the same way of [23]; the authors introduce
a notion of simulation, parametrised in a probability value, in order to capture the concept
of two networks exhibiting the same behaviour up-to such a probability. The model used
to represent wireless networks and define their formal behaviour is that of a pLTS.
In [11] the authors propose a probabilistic, energy-aware process calculus of networks.
In this calculus nodes can move probabilistically among locations of a given metric space.
Nodes can also choose the transmission radius of a broadcast in an optimal way with respect
to energy consumption. The authors propose a notion of probabilistic barbed congruence,
parametrised in a set of schedulers, for which they give a characterisation in terms of
bisimulations. The authors also introduce a preorder which compare networks which exhibit
the same behaviour according to the proposed contextual equivalence, but differ in terms
of energy consumption.
In [2] a variant of the calculus above is proposed, where energy consumption is no longer
considered and the possibility of interferences in communications is introduced. The authors
define a contextual equivalence in terms of probabilistic reduction barbed congruence, for
which they develop a sound and complete proof technique based on bisimulations.
In [15] a different approach is made to formalise a wireless network. The authors identify
a network as a set of processes associated with a location address and a queue, representing
the data at the datalink layer that a station has not yet broadcast. The calculus they use
is a probabilistic generalisation of the restricted broadcast process theory of [13]; here the
sending primitive consists of a message to be broadcast and a probability rate, representing
the likelihood that such a message will be sent. The model used to describe the behaviour
of a system is that of Continuous Time Markov Automata.
Appendix A. Properties of the Operator ‖>
Proof of Proposition 4.4(1): Let M = ΓM ✄M , N = ΓN ✄N , and suppose (M ‖> N )
is defined. Then such a network is equal to (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄ (M | N), for which we have to
verify two statements:
• (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (M |N) satisfies the constraints we have placed over all, possibly non well-
formed, networks. These require M | N ∈ sSys (that is, it does not contain replicated
node names), nodes(M |N) ⊆ ΓV , and (ΓM ∪ ΓN )E being irreflexive.
(1) M | N ∈ sSys; note that if there were a node name m which appears more than
once in M |N , then we should have m ∈ nodes(M),m ∈ nodes(N). This is because
M ∈ sSys, N ∈ sSys, so that m cannot appear more than once in M , nor in N . Thus
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the statement follows if we can prove that nodes(M) ∩ nodes(N) = ∅; since M ‖> N
is defined, it follows that nodes(M) ∩ (ΓN )V = ∅. Since nodes(N) ⊆ (ΓN )V , we also
have nodes(M) ∩ nodes(N) = ∅, and there is nothing left to prove.
(2) nodes(M |N) ⊆ (ΓM ∪ΓN )V ; note that nodes(M) ⊆ (ΓM )V and nodes(N) ⊆ (ΓN )V .
Therefore we have that
nodes(M |N) = nodes(M) ∪ nodes(N) ⊆ (ΓM )V ∪ (ΓN )V = (ΓM ∪ ΓN )V .
(3) (ΓM ∪ ΓN )E is irreflexive. Suppose (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ⊢ m → n; We need to show that
m 6= n. Note that we have either ΓM ⊢ m → n or ΓN ⊢ m → n; without loss of
generality, assume ΓM ⊢ m→ n. Since (ΓM )E is irreflexive, it follows that m 6= n.
• (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄ (M | N) satisfies the constraints of Definition 4.2. This amounts to prove
the following:
(1) for any m,n such that ΓM ∪ΓN ⊢ m⇄ n, either m ∈ nodes(M |N) or n ∈ nodes(M |
N).
Let m,n be two nodes for which (ΓM ∪ΓN ) ⊢ m⇄ n; that is either (ΓM ∪ΓN ) ⊢ m→
n or (ΓM∪ΓN ) ⊢ m← n. Without loss of generality, assume that (ΓM∪ΓN ) ⊢ m→ n.
In this case either ΓM ⊢ m → n or ΓN ⊢ m → n. We only give details for the
case in which ΓM ⊢ m → n, as the proof for the second case is analogous. Since
M ∈ Nets, we have that either m ∈ nodes(M) or n ∈ nodes(N). If m ∈ nodes(M)
then m ∈ nodes(M |N), while if n ∈ nodes(M), then n ∈ nodes(M |N). Thus, either
m ∈ nodes(M |N) or n ∈ nodes(M |N).
(2) Let m ∈ (ΓN ∪ΓN )V be a node such that (ΓM ∪ΓN ) ⊢ m⇄ n for no node n ∈ (ΓN )V .
Then m ∈ nodes(M |N).
Since m ∈ (ΓM ∪ ΓN )V then either ΓM ⊢ m or ΓN ⊢ m. Without loss of generality
let ΓM ⊢ m. Also, since (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ⊢ m ⇄ n for no n ∈ (ΓM ∪ ΓN )V , (ΓM )V ⊆
(ΓM ∪ ΓN )V and (ΓM )E ⊆ (ΓM ∪ ΓN )E , then we also have that ΓM ⊢ m⇄ n for no
n ∈ (ΓM )V .
Thus we have that ΓM ⊢ m and ΓM ⊢ m⇄ n for no n ∈ (ΓM )V . Since (ΓM ✄M) is
well-formed by hypothesis, we must have m ∈ nodes(M), from which it follows that
m ∈ nodes(M |N).
Proof of Proposition 4.4(2): It is sufficient to check that nodes(M) ∩ (N )V = ∅ and
nodes(M ‖> N ) ∩ (L)V = ∅ if and only if nodes(N ) ∩ (L)V = ∅ and nodes(M) ∩ (N ‖>
L)V = ∅. In fact, from this claim it follows that (M ‖> N ) ‖> L is defined if and only if
M ‖> (N ‖> L) is defined; the equality of these two networks follows from the associativity
of both set union and parallel composition of system terms.
LetM = ΓM ✄M , N = ΓN ✄N and L = ΓL✄L. We prove the two implications above
separately.
Suppose that
(nodes(M) ∩ (ΓN )V ) = ∅ (A.1)
(nodes(M |N) ∩ (ΓL)V ) = ∅ (A.2)
We want to show that nodes(N) ∩ (ΓL)V = ∅, and nodes(M) ∩ (ΓN ∪ ΓL)V = ∅. The
former statement is a straightforward consequence of Equation (A.2), since nodes(N) ⊆
nodes(M | N). The second statement can be proved as follows: let m ∈ nodes(M). By
Equation (A.1) we have that ΓN 6⊢ m, so that it remains to show ΓL 6⊢ m. This is a trivial
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consequence of Equation (A.2); in fact, sincem ∈ nodes(M), we also havem ∈ nodes(M |N),
and therefore ΓL 6⊢ m.
Now suppose that
(nodes(N) ∩ (ΓL)V ) = ∅ (A.3)
nodes(M) ∩ (ΓN ∪ ΓL)V = ∅ (A.4)
We need to show that nodes(M) ∩ (ΓN )V = ∅, and nodes(M | N) ∩ (ΓL)V = ∅. The
first statement is an immediate consequence of Equation (A.4), by noticing that (ΓN )V ⊆
(ΓN ∪ ΓL)V . For the second statement, let m be a node such that ΓL ⊢ m. By Equation
(A.3) we have that m /∈ nodes(N). Also, by Equation (A.4) it holds that m /∈ nodes(M);
in fact, since ΓL ⊢ m, we also have ΓN ∪ ΓL ⊢ m, and therefore m /∈ nodes(M). Since
m /∈ nodes(M) and m /∈ nodes(N), it follows that m /∈ nodes(M | N), as we wanted to
prove.
Proof of Proposition 4.6: . Let M = ΓM ✄M be a well-formed network, and assume
that nodes(M) 6= ∅. That is, there exists a node name m, a state s and a system term N
such that M ≡ mJsK |N .
Let G = ΓG ✄mJsK, where ΓG is defined by
(ΓG)V = {m} ∪ {n ∈ (ΓM )V | ΓM ⊢ m⇆ n} (A.5)
(ΓG)E = {(m,n) | ΓM ⊢ m→ n} ∪ {(n,m) | ΓM ⊢ n→ m}. (A.6)
Let also N = ΓN ✄N , where ΓN is defined by letting
(ΓN )V = nodes(N) ∪ {n | n 6= m,ΓM ⊢ m
′
⇆ n for some m′ ∈ nodes(N)} (A.7)
(ΓN )E = (ΓM )E \ (ΓG)E (A.8)
We need to show the following facts:
(1) G ∈ G,
(2) N ∈ Nets,
(3) nodes(G) ∩ (N )V = ∅,
(4) (M)V = (G)V ∪ (N )V ,
(5) (M)E = (GE) ∪ (N )E ,
(6) M ≡ mJsK |N .
Each of the statements above is proved separately. Note that (6) follows by the hy-
pothesis.
Proof of Statement 1: G ∈ G.
First note that |nodes(mJP K)| = 1, so that it suffices to show that G is well-formed. To
this end, we show that G satisfies both the constraints that we have placed over networks
and those given in Definition 4.2.
(1) mJsK ∈ sSys; this is trivial, since no node name can appear more than once in a system
term which contains only one node name
(2) nodes(mJsK) ⊆ (ΓG)V ; this statement follows from the definition of (ΓG)V , Equation
(A.5), which gives that {m} ⊆ (ΓG)V .
(3) (ΓG)E is irreflexive; note that (ΓG)E ⊆ (ΓM )E , and the latter is irreflexive. Therefore,
(ΓG)E has to be irreflexive as well.
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(4) Whenever ΓG ⊢ l ⇄ k for some nodes l, k, then either l ∈ nodes(mJsK) or k ∈
nodes(mJsK). Equivalently, we prove that whenever ΓG ⊢ l ⇄ k for some nodes l, k,
then either l = m or k = m.
Suppose ΓG ⊢ l ⇄ k; then either ΓG ⊢ l → k or ΓG ⊢ l ← k. Due to the arbitrariness
of l, k, it is sufficient to consider only the first case.
By Definition of (ΓG)E , Equation (A.6), either (l, k) = (m,n) for some n such that
ΓM ⊢ m → n, or (l, k) = (n,m) for some n such that ΓM ⊢ n → m. In the first case
we obtain l = m, in the second k = m, and there is nothing left to prove.
(5) If ΓG ⊢ n and ΓG ⊢ n ⇄ l for no l ∈ (ΓG)V , then n ∈ nodes(mJsK), or equivalently
n = m.
Note that if (ΓG ⊢ n then by Equation (A.5) either n = m, in which case there is
nothing to prove, or ΓM ⊢ m⇄ n. By Equation A.6 we also have that ΓG ⊢ m ⇄ n,
which contradicts the hypothesis.
Proof of Statement 2: N ∈ Nets.
We need to show that N satisfies the standard requirements we placed over all networks,
plus the requirements required for a network to be well-formed, that is those listed in
Definition 4.2
(1) N ∈ sSys. By hypothesis we already know that M ∈ sSys, and since M ≡ mJsK |N , it
follows that no node name appears in N more than once.
(2) nodes(N) ⊆ (ΓN )V . This follows immediately from Equation (A.7).
(3) (ΓN )E is irreflexive; this follows since, by Equation (A.8), (ΓN )E ⊆ (ΓM )E ; the latter
is irreflexive by hypothesis.
(4) Whenever ΓN ⊢ n ⇄ l for some nodes n and l, then either n ∈ nodes(N) or l ∈
nodes(N).
Due to the arbitrariness of node names n, l, it is sufficient to show that the property
holds whenever ΓN ⊢ n → l. Let n, l be two nodes such that ΓN ⊢ n → l. Note that
by Equation (A.8) we have that (ΓN )E ⊆ (ΓM )E ; since M is well-formed, it follows
that either n ∈ nodes(M) or l ∈ nodes(M).
However, since ΓN ⊢ n→ l, we also have that ΓN ⊢ n and ΓN ⊢ l, Equation (A.7) also
ensures that n, l 6= m.
Thus either n ∈ nodes(M) \ {m} or l ∈ nodes(M) \ {m}; but since M ≡ nJsK |N , and
M ∈ sSys, nodes(M) \ {m} is exactly nodes(N).
(5) if ΓN ⊢ n and ΓN ⊢ n ⇄ l for no l ∈ (ΓN )V , then n ∈ nodes(N). By Equation
A.7 either n ∈ nodes(N), in which case there is nothing to prove, or there exists
m′ ∈ nodes(N) such that ΓN ⊢ n ⇄ m
′. But this last case is not possible, since it
contradicts the hypothesis.
Proof of Statement 3: nodes(G) ∩ (ΓN )V = ∅.
Let n ∈ (ΓN )V ; we need to show that n 6= m. By Equation A.7 there are two possible
cases:
(1) n ∈ nodes(N), in which case m = n would contradict the hypothesis that M ≡
mJsK |N ∈ sSys, or
(2) n ∈ {l | ; l 6= m,ΓM ⊢ m
′
⇄ l for some m′ ∈ nodes(N)}; again n 6= m.
Proof of Statement 4: (ΓM )V = (ΓG)V ∪ (ΓN )V .
Note that equations (A.7) and (A.5) ensure that (ΓN )V ⊆ (ΓM )V and (ΓG)V ⊆ (ΓM )V ,
respectively. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that (ΓM )V ⊆ (ΓG)V ∪ (ΓN )V .
Suppose that ΓM ⊢ n. There are two possible cases:
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(1) n ∈ nodes(M); Since M ≡ mJsK | N , either n = m, in which case m ∈ (ΓG)V by
Equation (A.5), or n ∈ nodes(N), in which case n ∈ (ΓN )V by Equation (A.7),
(2) n ∈ Intf(M); since M is well-formed, there exists a node l ∈ nodes(M) such that
ΓM ⊢ l⇄ n. Then either l = m, in which case Equation (A.5) ensures that n ∈ (ΓG)V ,
or l ∈ nodes(N), in which case n ∈ (ΓN )V by Equation (A.7).
Proof of Statement 5: (ΓM )E = (ΓG)E ∪ (ΓN )E.
This follows immediately from Equation (A.8) and the fact that (ΓG)E ⊆ (ΓN )E .
Appendix B. Decomposition and Composition Results
To prove Propositions 5.6 and 5.7, we first need to prove the following statements for actions
which can be derived in the intensional semantics:
Proposition B.1 (Weakening). Let Γ1 ✄M be a network, and let Γ2 be such that(Γ2)V ∩
nodes(M) = ∅. Then
Γ1 ✄M
µ
−→∆ implies (Γ1 ∪ Γ2)✄M
µ
−→∆
where µ ranges over the actions m.τ,m.c!v,m.c?v.
Proof. By structural induction on the proof of the derivation Γ1 ✄M
µ
−→∆.
Proposition B.2 (Strengthening). Let Γ1✄M be a network, and let Γ2 such that (Γ2)V ∩
nodes(M) = ∅. Then
(Γ1 ∪ Γ2)✄M
µ
−→∆ implies Γ1 ✄M
µ
−→∆
where µ ranges over the actions m.τ,m.c!v,m.c?v.
Proof. By structural induction on the proof of the transition (Γ1 ∪ Γ2)
µ
−→∆.
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Let M = ΓM ✄M be a network and G = ΓN ✄ nJsK be a
generating network such that (M ‖> G) is defined. We prove only the first statement of
Proposition 5.6. The details for the other statements are similar.
Suppose then that (M ‖> G) τ7−−→ Λ. By definition of extensional actions we have two
possible cases.
(1) (M ‖> G)
m.τ
−→ Λ for some m ∈ nodes(M ‖> G) = nodes(M) ∪ {n}. We perform a case
analysis on whether m ∈ nodes(M) or m = n.
• If m ∈ nodes(M) then by Proposition 3.3 we have that M ‖> G ≡ (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄
mJτ.p + tK | M ′ | nJsK for some t, p,M ′ such that M ≡ mJτ.p + tK | M ′ and Λ ≡
(ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄ (P(mJpK) |M ′ | nJsK). Note that if we let ∆ = (ΓM ✄ P(mJpK) |M ′) we
can rewrite Λ as ∆ ‖> nJsK; further, Proposition 3.3 gives that M
m.τ
−→ ∆, which by
definition of extensional actions gives M τ7−−→ ∆.
• If m = n then by Proposition 3.3 we have that s ≡ τ.p + t for some p, t, while
Λ ≡ (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (M | nJP(p)K). If we let Θ = P(p) we can rewrite Λ = (ΓM ✄M) ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJΘK). Further, by the definition of the rules in the intensional semantics we
have that s
τ
−→Θ.
(2) (M ‖> G)
m.c!v
−→ Λ for some m ∈ nodes(M) ∪ {n} such that {l | (ΓM ∪ ΓN ⊢ m →
l)} ∩Out(M ‖> G) = ∅. Again we have to consider two different cases.
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• m ∈ nodes(M). By Proposition 3.5 we have that (M ‖> G) ≡ (ΓM∪ΓN )✄(mJc!〈e〉 .p+
tK |M ′ |nJsK) for some e, p, t,M ′ such that JeK = v and M ≡ mJc!〈e〉 .p+ tK |M ′, while
Λ = (ΓM ∪ ΓG)✄ P(mJpK) |Λ
′ for some Λ′ such that (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (M
′ | nJsK)
m.c?v
−→ Λ′.
It follows from Proposition 3.4 that Λ′ ≡ (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄ (∆
′ | nJΘK), where ∆′ and Θ
are such that (ΓM ∪ΓN)✄M
m.c?v
−→ ∆′ and (ΓM ∪ΓN )✄nJsK
m.c?v
−→ nJΘK). Now we can
apply Proposition B.2 to the transitions (ΓM ∪ΓN )✄mJc!〈e〉 .p+ tK
m.τ
−→P(mJpK) and
(ΓM∪ΓN)✄M
′m.c?v−→∆′ to obtain ΓM✄mJc!〈e〉 .p+tK
m.c!v
−→P(mJpK) and ΓM✄M
′m.c?v−→∆′,
respectively. These two transitions induce, via an application of rule (b-Sync), the
transition ΓM✄M
m.c!v
−→ ΓM✄P(mJpK) |∆
′; let ∆ = ΓM✄P(mJpK) |∆
′. The extensional
transition induced by the broadcast derived for ΓM ✄M can be either an internal
action or an extensional broadcast, depending on the topology of ΓM . First note that,
since Out(M ‖> G)∩{l |; (ΓM ∪ΓN ) ⊢ m→ l} = ∅, we have that Out(M)∩{l | ΓM ⊢
m→ l} ⊆ nodes(G) = {n}. Therefore we have two possible cases
– If ΓM ⊢ m 6→ n then we have the transition ΓM ✄M
τ7−−→ ∆. Now note that,
since m /∈ (ΓN )V , we also have that (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ⊢ m 6→ n. Then the transition
(ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄ nJsK
m.c?v
−→ nJΘK could have been derived only via an application of
either Rule (b-deaf) or Rule (b-disc). In both cases we have Θ = s.
– If ΓM ⊢ m→ n then we have that ΓM✄M
c!v✄{n}
7−−−−−−→ ∆. In this case the transition
(ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄ nJsK
m.c?v
−→ nJΘK could have been derived only via an application of
either Rule (b-rec) or Rule (b-rec). In the first case we have that s
c?v
−→Θ, while
in the second case we obtain that s 6
c?v
−−→ and Θ = s.
Finally, it is now easy to show that Λ = (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (P(mJpK) |∆
′ | nJΘK) = (ΓM ✄
P(mJpK) |∆′) ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK) = ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK).
• m = n. In this case we have that {l | (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ⊢ n→ l} ∩ Out(M ‖> G) = Out(G),
that is Out(G) = ∅. By Proposition 3.5 we have that s ≡ c!〈e〉 .p + t for some
e, p, t such that JeK = v. This ensures that s
c!v
−→ Θ, where Θ = P(p). Further,
(ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄M
n.c?v
−→ ∆M for some ∆M such that Λ ≡ (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (∆M | nJΘK). By
applying Proposition B.2 to the last transition we obtain ΓM ✄M
n.c?v
−→ ∆. Whether
this intensional transition induces an extensional one depends on the topology ΓM .
– if n ∈ In(M) then we have the extensional transition ΓM ✄M
n.c?v
−→ ∆,
– otherwise the transition above does not induce an extensional input. However, in
this case it is easy to show, using Proposition 3.4 that ∆ =M.
Finally, let ∆ = ΓM ✄ ∆M . Note that Λ ≡ (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄ (∆M | nJΘK) = ∆ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJΘK).
Lemma B.3 (Strong Composition of tau-actions). Let M be a network, and G = (ΓN ✄
nJsK) be a generating network such that M ‖> G is well-defined. If M τ7−−→ ∆ then M ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ7−−→ ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK).
Proof. Let M = ΓM ✄M If M
τ7−−→ ∆; then ∆ = ΓM ✄∆M for some ∆M . By definition
of extensional tau actions, there are two possibilities:
(1) M
m.τ
−→∆M for some m ∈ nodes(M). By Proposition B.1 we obtain that (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄
M
m.τ
−→∆, and finally (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄M | nJsK
m.τ
−→ (∆M ✄ )JsnK by Rule (b-tau− prop).
Note that (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (∆M ✄ )JsnK = ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK);
(2) M
m.c!v
−→ ∆M , and ΓM ⊢ m → l for no l ∈ Out(M); in particular ΓM ⊢ m 6→ n,
which also gives (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ⊢ m 6→ n. Therefore we can infer the transition (ΓM ∪
ΓN ) ✄ nJsK
m.c?v
−→ nJsK. By Proposition B.1 we have that ΓM ✄ M
m.c!v
−→ ∆M implies
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(ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ✄M
m.c!v
−→ ∆M . Now we can apply Rule (b-Sync) to obtain the transition
(ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (M | nJsK)
m.c!v
−→ (ΓM ∪ ΓN )✄ (∆M | nJsK). Note that the last network can
be rewritten as ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK). Finally, since ΓM ⊢ m → l for no l ∈ Out(M) and
ΓN 6⊢ m, it follows that (ΓM ∪ ΓN ) ⊢ n 6→ l for any l ∈ Out(M ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)). Hence
we have the extensional transition M ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ7−−→ ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK.
Proof of Proposition 5.7. We only prove statements (1)(i), (2)(i) and (2)(ii); details for
the other statements are similar.
(1) Suppose that ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ and let ΓN , n, s be such that ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK) is well-defined.
We have to show that ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK).
We first prove a weaker result: if ∆ τ7−−→ ∆′ then ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ7−−→ ∆′ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJsK). To see why this is true, rewrite ∆ as
∑
i∈I pi · Mi, where
∑
i∈I pi ≤
1. Then there exists a collection of distributions {∆′i}i∈I such that Mi
τ7−−→ ∆′i and
∆′ =
∑
i∈I pi · ∆
′
i. We can apply Lemma B.3 to each of such transitions to obtain
Mi ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ7−−→ ∆′i ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK). It follows that
∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK) =
∑
i∈I
pi ·Mi ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ7−−→
∑
i∈I
pi ·∆
′
i ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
= ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
Now suppose that ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆′. Then there exist two collections if sub-distributions
{∆→k }k≥0 and ∆
×
k such that ∆
′ =
∑∞
k=0∆
×
k and
∆ = ∆→0 + ∆
×
0
∆→0
τ7−−→ ∆→1 + ∆
×
1
...
...
...
∆→k
τ7−−→ ∆→k+1 + ∆
×
k+1
...
...
...
For any k ≥ 0, let Θ→k = ∆
→
k ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK, and define Θ
×
k analogously. Note
that Θ→0 + Θ
×
0 = ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK). Also, from the previous statement we can infer
that Θ→k
τ7−−→ (∆→k+1 + ∆
×
k+1) ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK). This last sub-distribution is exactly
Θ→k+1 + Θ
×
k+1. Therefore we have that ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
τ
|==⇒
∑∞
k=0Θ
×
k . It remains to
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note that
∞∑
k=0
Θ×k = Θ
×
k = ∆
×
k ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
=
(
∞∑
k=0
∆×k
)
‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
= ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
(2) Suppose now that ∆
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′ for some η with n /∈ η; we have to show that ∆ ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK).
First note that, wheneverM
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆M , with n /∈ η thenM ‖> (ΓN✄nJsK)
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→
∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK). We leave the proof of this result to the reader. An immediate
consequence of the result above is that whenever ∆
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆′ and s
c?v
−→ Θ, then
∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK).
Finally, suppose that ∆
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′, where n /∈ η. We proceed by induction on the
definition of weak extensional outputs.
• The base case is ∆
τ
|==⇒ ∆1
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆2
τ
|==⇒ ∆′; in this case we have that ∆ ‖>
(ΓN✄nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆1 ‖> (ΓN✄nJsK)
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆2 ‖> (ΓN✄nJsK)
τ
|==⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN✄nJsK),
as we wanted to prove.
• Suppose now that ∆
c!v✄η1|======⇒ ∆1
c!v✄η2|======⇒ ∆′, where η1 ∩ η2 = ∅ and η1 ∪ η2 = η.
Note that in this case n /∈ η1 and n /∈ η2. By inductive hypothesis we have that
∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η1|======⇒ ∆1 ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η2|======⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK), and there
is nothing left to prove.
• Suppose that ∆
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′ for some η such that {n} ⊂ η. Also, suppose that s
c?v
−→Θ.
In this case we want to prove that ∆ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η′
|=====⇒ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJsK),
where η′ = η \ {n}. The proof of these statements relies on the following technical
result, whose proof is left to the reader: if M
c!v✄η
7−−−−−→ ∆′ and s
c?v
−→ Θ, then M ‖>
(ΓN ✄ nJsK)
c!v✄η′
7−−−−−→ ∆′ ‖> (ΓN ✄ nJΘK), where η
′ = η \ {n}. Then the proof of the
main result can be performed as in the previous case, by noting that if the transition
∆
c!v✄η
|=====⇒ ∆′ is induced by ∆
c!v✄η1|======⇒ ∆1
c!v✄η2|======⇒ ∆′, where η1 ∪ η2 = η and
η1 ∩ η2 = ∅, then it cannot be n ∈ η1 and n ∈ η2. In this case it is necessary to rely
on Proposition 5.7(2)(i), which has already been proved.
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